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File: 950825_84531291.txtFilename:84531291 PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 31291 GENDATE: 950623 NNNN TEXT: ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX285 MCN = 91100/33954 TOR = 911001924 PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0145 1001924-RUEALGX. ZNY HEADER P 101924Z APR 91 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEALGX/SAFE P 081900Z APR 91 FM DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD //AFMIC-ZA// TO RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON THREE RULYSCC/COMSERVRON TWO RULYSCC/COMSERVRON FOUR RULYSCC/COMSERVRON EIGHT RULYSCC/MSSG ELEVEN RHIPAAA/USCENTCOM FWD HQS //J2/SG// RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT //SG// RUDCHAA/ARCENT FWD //MD// RUDCAAA/CDR7THTRANSGP //AFFG-C-S2// RUCLEUA/CDRUSASC FT RUCKER AL //CSSC-ZM// RUEBMDA/CDR6THINFDIV(L) FT WAINWRIGHT AK //APVR-SG// RUCIWMA/CDRTACOM WARREN MI //AMSTA-SF// RUCLBFA/CDRIII CORPS FT HOOD TX //AFZF-GS-CMD// RUWTATA/CDR807THMEDBDE SEAGOVILLE TX //AFKB-GC-CT-HS// RUKGNPA/EODTEU TWO FT STORY VA //03// RUKGNPA/CDR11THTRANSBN FT STORY VA //AFFG-I-S2// RUEHEY/USDAO CAIRO EG RUFLBJA/CDRJLD VICENZA IT RUCLBFA/CDR1STCAVDIV FT HOOD TX //G2/CM&D// RHIBHAC/CDR24THINFDIV FWD //CM&D/G2// RHIBHAA/CDR101STABNDIVAASLT FWD //CM&D/G2// RHIIMAA/VMA THREE ONE ONE //S2// RUDPTOC/XVIII ABN CORPS INTEL CEN FT BRAGG NC RHIPAAA/USCINCENT //CCJ2// RULYSCC/COMPHIBGRU THREE ATF RHCULRA/USAFHOSP LITTLE ROCK AFB AR //SGAX// RUVRBGA/TAG MS JACKSON MS //MS-DOT-O/213TH MED BDE// RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC //USDP-GLOBAL// RUKGNEC/USACMH WASHINGTON DC //DAMH-RAO// RUEDFHA/439MAW WESTOVER AFB MA //SGPM// RULSMCA/MARCORINTCEN QUANTICO VA RHFQAAA/58MAS ALCC RAMSTEIN AB GE //CC// RHFQZAF/316AD CLINIC RAMSTEIN AB GE //SGAX/SGPM// RHFQZAF/609USAFCONTHOSP ZWEIBRUCKEN AB GE //SG// RUFLAEA/7241ABG CLINIC IZMIR TU //SGPM// RULYSCC/CG V MEF CSSE //HSSU// RHCGSRA/CG FOURTH FSSG //4OPS// RHQIIEG/TWO FOUR MEU //MED// RHBTLHA/USS TARAWA AIG 6623 AIG 12630 AIG 8598 RUEORDA/TCC FT DETRICK MD INFO RULYSCC/CTF SIX THREE RUEORDA/XMT USAFHOSP LITTLE ROCK AFB AR //SGQ// RUEORDA/CDR2DARMDIV FT HOOD TX //AFZF-SC-MG// RUEORDA/CDRVIICORPS MOEHRINGEN GE //AETSSU// RUEORDA/USAFHOSP HELLENIKON AB GR //MIO// RUKRATB/DET 3 625MASG HELLENIKON AB GR RUEORDA/COMUSNAVLOGSUPFOR //N4/N9// BT SECTION 001 OF 002 /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ BODY SUBJ: AFMIC WEEKLY WIRE 14-91 (U) 1. GENERAL (U) THIS MESSAGE CONSISTS OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND GENERAL MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE. IT IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A TIMELY SUMMARY OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS. THE REMARKS ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO REVISION AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT AN AGREED DOD POSITION. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS (U) A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) THREAT AGAINST U.S. FORCES AND IRAQI CIVILIANS (U) B. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] C. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] D. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 3. INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS (U) A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE BW) THREAT AGAINST U.S. FORCES AND IRAQI CIVILIANS (U) PRIOR TO OPERATION DESERT STORM, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSED THAT IRAQ HAD A MATURE BW PROGRAM, WITH ANTHRAX AND BOTULINUM TOXIN HAVING REACHED THE WEAPONIZATION STAGE BY DECEMBER 1990. ALTHOUGH MANY DETAILS OF THE PROGRAM WERE KNOWN, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF BULK AND WEAPONIZED STOCKPILES AVAILABLE TO THE IRAQIS. SUBSEQUENT COALITION BOMBING OF IDENTIFIED IRAQI BW FACILITIES SERIOUSLY DAMAGED IRAQ'S CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE, WEAPONIZE, AND STORE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. HOWEVER, NUMEROUS UNVERIFIED REPORTS HAVE ALLEGED THAT IRAQ EITHER HAD PLANNED REDUNDANCY IN THE SYSTEM BY ESTABLISHING BACK-UP BW FACILITIES OR WAS ABLE TO MOVE PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES AND STOCKPILES TO ALTERNATE SITES PRIOR TO OR DURING HOSTILITIES. TO DATE, NONE OF THESE ALLEGED FACILITIES HAVE BEEN LOCATED. FURTHERMORE, NO BIOLOGICAL AGENTS WERE USED AGAINST COALITION FORCES DURING HOSTILITIES, AND NO BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS WERE FOUND IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR IRAQ'S FAILURE TO USE BW WERE (1) FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES BW USE MIGHT ENGENDER, SUCH AS POSSIBLE RETALIATION BY COALITION FORCES WITH THEIR OWN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, (2) DIFFICULTY IN MOVING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TO THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, (3) INAPPROPRIATE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR BW USE, (4) DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S BW USE CAPABILITY BY ALLIED BOMBING, (5) LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE WEAPONS, OR (6) AN INABILITY TO ACTUALLY WEAPONIZE THE AGENTS IN THE FIRST PLACE. WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ RETAINS A VESTIGIAL CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE AND DELIVER BW AGENTS. HOWEVER, WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ IS UNLIKELY TO USE BW AGAINST U.S. FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA BECAUSE SADDAM HUSSEIN PERCEIVES THAT TO DO SO WOULD INITIATE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES AND PROVIDE THE COALITION A REASON TO FORCIBLY REMOVE HIM FROM POWER. IN ADDITION, IRAQ'S CAPABILITY TO TRANSPORT AND USE BW AGENTS, IF ANY STILL EXIST, IS SERIOUSLY DEGRADED. ALTHOUGH WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ IS UNLIKELY TO USE BW AGAINST REBEL FORCES AND CIVILIANS IN IRAQ, SADDAM IS MORE LIKELY TO USE BW AGAINST REBEL FORCES IN IRAQ THAN AGAINST COALITION FORCES BECAUSE HE MAY BELIEVE THAT USE WITHIN THE COUNTRY WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROVE.[ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ][ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ] 4. [ (b)(2) ] 5. [ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ] BT #0146 INFODATE: 0
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