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File: 950925_604rpt_93o.txt
Page: 93o
Total Pages: 1


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1.  Responding to a Czech report of chemical agent detection 
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, DIA  [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ] 
 for a [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]  on the Czech findings of 
chemical agents.

2.  Incident I:

a. On 19 January 1991 two Czech NBC detachments detected nerve 
agents at their positions north and northwest of Hafr Al 
Batin. Each unit was operating [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    
] detectors, which use the active biochemical butyryl 
cholinesterase (BChE). Following the initial alarm, each unit 
then used [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] units, which also 
use BChE, and determined through sampling protocol, the 
presence and limits of the concentration nf the agent. One 
detachment also collected an air sample which was analyzed in 
a mobile field lab and determined to contain the nerve agent 
Sarin (GB).

b. The concentration of Sarin in the air sampled was 
determined through basic sampling protocols to be between 5 x 
l0-5 and 5 x 10-7 milligrams per liter. The elapsed time from 
the initial alarm to the all clear was about 40 minutes. GB is 
considered a "non-persistent agent," which dissipates in the 
air in various periods of time.

c. This detection was made during a period in which there were 
no SCUD missiles launches, artillery exchanges, or other 
military action(s) observed by the Czechs in the area. 
Further. there were no CW detections reported by other units 
in this area. The Czechs observed that there were no 
identifiable physiological manifestations (such as eye, nose, 
or breathing problems) which might be associated with such an 
exposure to this chemical agent dosage.

d. The nearest location of any known lraqi storage or 
production was some 150 km away from the area where the agent 
was detected. In order for the detection that was made to have 
resulted from a collateral release of GB from this area, large 
amounts of agents would have had to have been released, which 
would than have drifted over troop concentrations causing 
casualties. Other units would have detected the presence of 
agents in these amounts. No such events were reported.

e. The Czechs did not see any physical evidence that the 
chemical agents detected were the result of offensive or 
hostile actions by the Iraqi forces. The Czechs flled a sitrep 
on their detection.

3.           Incident II:

a. Approximately five days after the detection of the GB 
agent, a Saudi liaison officer approached the 3rd Czech NBC 
detachment subordinated to the Saudi Royal Forces in King 
Khalid Military City (KKMC) and requested that they 
investigate a "suspicious"  area in the desert. The liaison 
officer directed the NBC detachment from KKMC to a location a 
few kilometers north-northwest of KKMC.

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As they approached the area he queried them if they shouldn't 
 don their protective gear, which they did. Upon arriving  at 
the site, they found a wet area on the desert floor, measuring 
ahout 60 cm by 200  cm in dimension. They
tested this with two separate methods, and determined that the soil was
contaminated sulphur mustard agent.

b. The Czech officers who had been on the scene said that 
there were no munitions fragments, craters, or other 
indications of military involvement with this site. The Czechs 
also said there were no SCUD alerts for this area immediately 
prior to this finding. Followinq the determination of the 
presence of mustard, the detachment left the area. A sitrep 
was filed with the Saudi Command of the Joint Forces North 
Area HQ in KKMC.

4.     The only units to have detected and confirmed the 
presence of chemical agents during Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
were the three Czech detachments, all of which were 
subordinated to the Joint Forces North Area under the command 
of the Royal Saudi Liberation Forces. The detections involved 
each of the three units, and occurred within a single five day 
period. No prior or subsequent detections were made, or 
confirmed by the Czech detachments.

5.  [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]

6.          DIA has assembled a team of experts and military 
officers to completely  review and analyze all the information 
within the Department for relevance to these Czech findings. 
They are currently reviewing CENTCOM's logs and records, troop 
dispositions and order of battle, and battle damage 
assessments. At this juncture, the facts do not tie any known 
Iraqi offensive military actions to these CW detections.

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