Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

File: 950925_607rpt_000.txt
Page: 000
Total Pages: 1

SITUATION REPORT

Filename:607rpt.000


Subject: SITUATION REPORT

The Czech newspaper "MLkDA FRONTA DNES" reported on 29 July 
that Minister of Defense BAUDYS had confirmed that the 
Czechoslovak anti-chemical unit sent to the Persian Gulf 
during Operation Desert Storm had, at the beginning of the 
conflict, measured trace concentrations of the nerve paralytic 
agent SARIN. He flatly denied that the delay in confirming 
earlier press reports of the incident was in any way due to an 
alleged U.S. prohibition on publishing information on 
Operation Desert Storm without prior consultation. The MoD 
explained that only during the current week had the ministry 
received reliable information on this score, and this was the 
reason that the ministry on 7 July had stated that there was 
no indication that the nerve paralytic agents SARIN and 
YPERITE had been employed in the Gulf.

On 2 Sep, Congressman BROWDER met with [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ] to discuss the Czechoslovak detection of nerve 
agents. It was at this meeting that BROWDER asked that the MoD 
provide the US a copy of the report concerning detection of 
the agent, substantive supporting documents, and that the 
Czechs continue to cooperate with the USG on this matter. [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] agreed.

On 1 October, the MoD passed a copy of their investigative 
report to the [   (b)(2)   ]. Both the [   (b)(2)   ] issued 
messages on the report.

On 12-14 Oct 93, a group of three individuals[   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ]

On 25 October 1993, at 0900, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]who 
was commander of chemical troops in the Gulf. The intent of 
the meeting was to reach a final determination of the time and 
location of the chemical detections during Desert Storm.

 reported GB agent was detected at three locations, within 45 
minutes, sometime between 1500 and 1700, Saudi time, between 
19 and 21 January 1991, inclusive. The 2nd Detachment, with 
the 4th Saudi Brigade, detected the agent at two locations, 46 
degrees, 10 to 12 minutes east, 28 degrees, 43 minutes north, 
and 46 degrees, 12 to 13 minutes east, 28 degrees, 44 minutes 
north. The 3rd Detachment, traveling with the 20th Saudi 
Brigade detected GB at roughly 46 degrees, 30 minutes east, 28 
degrees, 45 minutes north. According to [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ], this location is an approximation, because of 
difficulties associated with determining precise location 
while on the move.

The time of 1500 to 1700 hours is in disagreement with the 
time, 0845 (Central European Time), 19 January, which was 
recorded on the Czechoslovak General Staff logs, handwritten 
in Prague from telephone/radio transmissions. These logs are 
part of the official Czech Ministry of Defense report, which 
was released by Minister of Defense BAUDYS on 1 October. 
However, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] is adamant that the 
entries are incorrect.

According to [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] the detection of 
mustard agent by the 1st Detachment



occurred 7 to 10 days after the GB detection, sometime between 
1000 to 1100, Saudi time. The reported location was 45 
degrees, 34 minutes east, 28 degrees, 2 minutes north. Again, 
this date and time are in conflict with the log entry in the 
official MoD report, which lists the detection as occurring 19 
January, 0800, Central European Time. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) 
  ] is adamant that the log entry is incorrect.

[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] offered an explanation for errors 
in the log entries. This log was maintained in Prague, and the 
information is third hand at best. The original information 
was recorded in a local log maintained by the Czechoslovak 
unit in Saudi Arabia. This information, however, was given to 
Czechoslovak communicators, encrypted, sent to Prague, 
decrypted, and then recorded in the Prague log. [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ] believes that this process could lend itself to 
the recording of incorrect data in the Prague log.

[   (b)(2)   ] Prague places more credence in [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ] recollection, who was on the spot at the time, 
than on the third hand recording in the Prague maintained 
logs.

However, because of the importance in determining the correct 
time and date, [   (b)(2)   ] Prague requested a determination 
if any logs originally recorded on the ground in Saudi Arabia 
still existed. At 1620L on 25 October, the Foreign Liaison 
Office reported that these logs were located in the personal 
safe of the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ], who is out of the 
country. On 26 October, an attempt will be made to gain access 
to these records.

On 26 October, the safe containing the logs was opened, but 
revealed the exact same records as those already secured by [ 
  (b)(2)   ]

[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]


 



 

 



Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search