Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

File: 950925_68240011_94.txt
Page: 94
Total Pages: 1

IIR 6 824 0011 94/CHEMICAL AGENT ANALYSIS BY 

Filename:68240011.94
CDSN = LGX308   MCN = 93291/08368   TOR = 932911058 
PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS7067 2911056-    --RUEALGX. 
ZNY 
P 181056Z OCT 93 
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC 
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC 
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC 
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC 
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC 
RHFPAAA/UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN-CMO// 
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2/N22// 
[   (b)(2)   ]
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD 
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN// 
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP 
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2// 
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA 
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
RUEALGX/SAFE 
P 181043Z OCT 93 
FM [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY 
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EEY/EUR-PM// 
RUEKJCS/JOINTSTAFF WASHDC//J-5/PMA// 
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:SEE// 
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE 
RUEOAYB/FSTC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA//AIFICA// 
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
BT 
 

 
SERIAL:  (U) IIR 6 824 0011 94. 
 
 
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ 
COUNTRY:  (U) CZECH REPUBLIC (EZ). 
 
SUBJ:  IIR 6 824 0011 94/CHEMICAL AGENT ANALYSIS BY 
[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] MOBILE LABORATORY DURING DESERT 
STORM 
(U) 
 
WARNING:  (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT 
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.  [   (b)(2)   ]


/----------------------------------------------------- 
                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
/----------------------------------------------------- 
 
DOI:  (U) 910117-910830. 
 
REQS:  (U) [   (b)(2)   ]
 
SOURCE:  A- [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

         B- [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

         C- [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

 
SUMMARY:  INFORMATION PROVIDED SUBSTANTIATES THAT A 
G-SERIES, PROBABLY SARIN, WAS DETECTED AT VERY LOW 
CONCENTRATIONS.  THESE CONCENTRATIONS WERE DETERMINED 
NOT TO BE OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE OR THREAT TO HEALTH.  THE 
SOURCE OF THE AGENT REMAINS UNKNOWN. 
 
TEXT:  1.  FOLLOWING THE DETECTION OF NERVE AGENT 
DURING OPERATIONS ON THE 19TH OF JANUARY, 1991 [   (b)(2)   ]
                                        AN AIR SAMPLE 
WAS COLLECTED ON DRIML SILICA GEL AND SENT BACK TO KING 
KAHLID MILITARY CITY (KKMC) FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS.  THE 
RESULTS OF THIS SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS INDEPENDENTLY 
SUBSTANTIATED THE DETERMINATION OF NERVE AGENT 
DETECTION.
 
2. THE ANALYSIS WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE FIELD 
LABORATORY, DESIGNATED [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] MOBILE 
LAB.  
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]






 
3.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]






4.  [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] MOBILE LAB UTILIZED WET 
CHEMISTRY AND 
SPECTROSCOPY TO IDENTIFY THE COLLECTION AGENT AS SARIN. 
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]










 
5.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]











THE SPECIFIC SEQUENCE OF STEPS AND DETERMINATIONS RULES OUT SUCH 
AGENTS AS TABUN AND GF, AND RESULTED IN THE DETERMINATION THAT THE 
AGENT DETECTED WAS SARIN (GB). 
 
 
SERIAL:  (U) IIR 6 824 0011 94. 
 
[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] MOBILE LABORATORY DURING DESERT 
STORM 
(U) 
6.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
THE CZECHOSLOVAKS DISCUSSED DETECTION OF THE NERVE 
AGENT AND THAT OF THE MUSTARD AGENT [   (b)(2)   ]
                 WITHT BOTH THE SAUDIS AND ALSO AMERICAN 
LIAISON OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE JOINT FORCES NORTHERN 
AREA.  FURTHER, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] EVERYONE ON THE 
SCENE AGREED THAT THESE DETERMINATIONS WERE "STRANGE", 
BT THAT IN LIGHT OF THE EXTREMELY LOW LEVELS OF 
DETECTED AGENT, THEY DID NOT REPRESENT ANY THREAT TOU 
TROOPS STATIONED IN THE AREA, OR THAT THEY COULD HAVE 
BEEN THE RESULT OF ANY ENEMY ACTIONS. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
THIS DETERMINATION WAS VERY SHORT LIVED, WAS A 
SINGULAR EVENT WHICH WAS NOT REPEATED, AND WAS CONFINED 
TO A VERY SMALL PORTION OF THE LARGER AREA OF 
OPERATIONS.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] IN TERMS OF 
CONCENTRATIONS, SUCH A TEST CARRIED OUT ADJACENT TO A 
CHEMICAL PLANT PRODUCING INSECTICIDES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY 
RESULT IN AN EQUAL, IF NOT IN FACT, GREATER 
CONCENTRATION OF "AGENT" BEING DETECTED. 
 
7.  THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM THAT [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
SOLDIERS EXPERIENCED WAS THE FEAR AND AXIETY ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE UNKNOWN, THAT IS POSSIBLE CHEMICAL ATTACKS.  AS AN 
EXAMPLE, ONE OF [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] TROOPS WAS ERECTING 
SOME EQUIPMENT AT THE TIME OF AN ALERT AND THAT IT TOOK THIS 
SOLDIER SOME PEREOD OF TIME TO REACH HIS PROTECTIVE 
GEAR AND DON IT.  BY THAT TIME, THE SOLDIER HAD BECOME 
CONVINCED THAT HE HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO CHEMICAL AGENT, 
AND EXPERIENCED BREATHING PROBLEMS, SHAKES, AND OTHER 
PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS OF CHEMICAL EXPOSURE.  THIS TROOP HAD 
TO BE REMOVED BACK TO A REAR AREA, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS 
DETERMINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHEMICAL ATTACK, NO 
AGENT HAD BEEN DETECTED, AND THAT HE WAS PHYSICALLY 
FIT, THE EMOTIONAL STRAIN OF THE THREAT WAS ITSELF 
COMPLETELY DEBILITATING FOR THIS SOLDIER. 
 
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
THESE CHEMICAL DETECTIONS HAD NOT BEEN REPORTED 
THOUGH THE NBC WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEM, TO CENTCOM 
HEADQUARTERS, OR DIA AT THE TIME. 
 
2.   THERE IS AT PRESENT NO INFORMATION 
AVAILABLE AS TO THE SOURCE OF ANY OF THE TWO AGENTS 
DETECTED, OR HOW THEY CAME TO BE DETECTED IN THE 
LOCATIONS THEY WERE FOUND. 

3.   IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT BOTH DETECTIONS OF 
MUSTARD AND GB WERE MADE IN THE SAME AREA OF 
OPERATIONS, BY DIFFERENT CZECHOSLOVAK NBC UNITS, AND 
WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF EACH OTHER, AND THAT NO PREVIOUS OR 
SUBSEQUENT DETECTION WAS MADE BY THE CZECHOSLOVAKS 
DURING THE LENGTH OF THEIR STAY IN THE GULF.  NO 
FURTHER FOLLOW UP ACTIONS BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY 
OF DEFENSE IS UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THIS TIME. 
 
IPSP:  (U) PG 1610//. 
COMSOBJ:  (U) 143//. 
PROJ:  (U). 
INSTR:  (U) US NO. 
PREP:  (U) [   (b)(2)   ]
ACQ:  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
DISSEM:  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
WARNING:  (U) [   (b)(2)   ]
 



 

 



Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search