IIR 2 219 0006 91/ BASRA, IRAQ/IRAN FRONT, FIELD SANITA-

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SERIAL:    (U) IIR 2 219 0006 91. 
 

COUNTRY:   (U) IRAQ (IZ). 
 
SUBJECT:  IIR 2 219 0006 91/ BASRA, IRAQ/IRAN FRONT, FIELD SANITA- 
TION AND INCIDENCE OF DISEASE, DESERT SHIELD (U).

 
 
WARNING:   (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED

INTELLIGENCE.    [b.2.]

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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
 
DOI:       (U) 881000. 
 
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]UMMARY:       FIELD SANITATION PRACTICES ON THE FRONT WERE
RUDIMEN- 
TARY.  THE QUANTITY OF WATER WAS ALWAYS LIMITED, SO BATHING WAS 
PERMITTED ONLY INFREQUENTLY.  HEPATITIS WAS A CONSTANT MEDICAL
PROB- 
LEM ON THE FRONT. 
 
TEXT:      (U) 
1. (U) PLACE NAME 
BASRA//GEOCOORD:3030N/04747E// (BGN GAZ, IRAQ). 
2.     DETAILS 
POOR HYGIENE WAS A FACT OF LIFE ON THE FRONT DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ 
WAR.  WATER WAS ALWAYS IN SHORT SUPPLY SO SOLDIERS WERE ALLOWED TO 
SHOWER ONLY EVERY TWO MONTHS.  SOLDIERS ALSO WORE THE SAME CLOTHING

FOR TWO MONTHS.  SOURCE DID NOT IDENTIFY LACK OF CLEANLINESS AS A 
MAJOR FACTOR AFFECTING THE HEALTH OF THE COMMAND, BUT THE LIMITED 
SUPPLY OF WATER DID HAVE DIRECT CONSEQUENCES.  THE MOST SERIOUS,
AND 
THE MOST FREQUENTLY OCCURRING ILLNESS WAS HEPATITIS.  THE INCIDENCE

OF HEPATITIS WAS BLAMED ON SOLDIERS DRINKING CONTAMINATED WATER
WHICH 
THEY WERE FORCED TO DO AS A RESULT OF THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF WATER 
SUPPLIED BY THE ARMY.  SOLDIERS ROUTINELY DRANK FROM SOURCES OF
WATER 
NOT YET TESTED RATHER THAN GO THIRSTY.  SPECIFIC RATES OF INFECTION

OF HEPATITIS WERE NOT KNOWN, BUT SOMEONE ALWAYS HAD IT.  THERE WAS
A 
GREAT DEAL OF FEIGNED ILLNESS AT THE FRONT AND THE LEVEL OF DEPRES-

SION WAS HIGH.  POOR LIVING CONDITIONS WERE IDENTIFIED AS FACTORS 
THAT LED TO MALINGERING AND DEPRESSION.  NFI.  DIARRHEA WAS
PRESENT, 
ESPECIALLY WHEN WEATHER CONDITIONS CHANGED GREATLY AND WHEN THE 
SOLDIERS WERE INFREQUENTLY GIVEN SPOILED FOOD.  A DOCTOR WAS AVAIL-

ABLE FOR SOURCE'S COMPANY (CO),   [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]
                                      HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE
WAS 
A CIVILIAN OR IN THE MILITARY.  NFI.  THE DOCTOR'S PRINCIPLE DUTIES

CONSISTED OF DETERMINING WHO WAS REALLY SICK AND THEN ASSIGNING THE

SICK SOLDIERS TO BED REST.  SOURCE DID NOT RECALL ANY MEDICAL OR 
SURGICAL PROCEDURES HAVING BEEN CONDUCTED ON THE FRONT AND HE DID
NOT 
RECALL IF SOLDIERS ASSIGNED TO BED REST FOR HEPATITIS WERE GIVEN 
MEDICATION.  NFI.  SOURCE'S CO HAD NO MEDICS.  EVACUATION
PROCEDURES 
WERE NOT KNOWN.  INFANTRY SQUADS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR DIGGING THEIR

OWN LATRINES.  LATRINES CONSISTED OF TRENCHES ONE TO TWO METERS
LONG, 
AND 1.5 METERS DEEP AND WERE EXPECTED TO LAST ONE WEEK.  AFTER ONE 
WEEK, THE TRENCH WAS COVERED AND A NEW ONE WAS DUG IN THE SAME
GENER- 
AL AREA.  SOURCE DID NOT RECALL LATRINES HAVING BEEN TREATED WITH 
CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES OR HAVING BEEN MARKED AFTER THEY WERE COVERED. 
NFI.  SMALLER GROUPS OF SOLDIERS, SUCH AS THOSE MANNING OBSERVATION

POSTS TO THE FRONT OF THE CO, DUG SHORTER LATRINE TRENCHES, BUT THE

SHORTER TRENCHES WERE SUPPOSED TO ALSO BE 1.5 METERS DEEP.  NFI. 
 
COMMENTS:  (U) (FIELD COMMENT) -- 

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