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SUBJECT: IRAQI BATTLEFIELD DEVELOPMENT PLAN Department of the Army United States Army Intelligence and Security Command United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center Iraqi Battlefield Development Plan Publication date: January 1994 Information cutoff date: June 1993 National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Preface The regional battlefield Development Plan (BDP) series of publications are being developed to serve as baseline threat documents to support Army force modernization programs. The BDP is produced in response to US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) intelligence production requirements (IPR) CAC-91-C646- 001, CAC-93-C639-003, Headquarters Department of Army IPR DA-92- C763-001, Army Materiel Command AMC-92-EJ-S-013. The BDP have four basic purposes: - To define the threat environment for combat developers and training and doctrine efforts - To serve as approved, authoritative, and standardized baseline documents for preparation of System Threat Assessment Reports - To serve as a starting point and reference for preparing high- and low-resolution scenarios - To serve as a baseline reference in developing unclassified threat studies. This volume will present a current and forecasted estimate of Iraqi strategy, operations, and tactics in 10, 15, and 20 year increments, where possible. Trends in weapons acquisition and force modernization also will be addressed for the same time periods. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] Four key assumptions were made at the beginning of the BDP production effort. These assumptions were necessary to set realistic limits to the subsequent analytical effort. it is imperative that the reader understand these assumptions so as to better appreciate our force modernization trends and projections. The assumptions are: [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] An extremely important data source used in preparation of this document was Iraqi military literature captured during the Gulf War. This included manuals and copies of unit orders. Analysts will continue to exploit this material, as it becomes available, and will incorporate pertinent information into follow-on updates. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] For purposed of clarity and conciseness, we have elected to use a modified version the Decision Support Template (DST) and the Synchronization Matrix to illustrate battlefield operating system (BOS) integration in different tactical situations. These are described in detail in Chapter 4 of FM 34-3, "Intelligence Analysis." Because of time constraints, this particular iterations of the IDBP has only one DST, and it is in section 7-2. As this document evolves, however, more DSTs will be included to cover the rest of the tactical scenarios, both current and projected. For timely updating, the IBDP is organized in stand-alone chapters. Each chapter will be updated on a yearly basis. This study was prepared by the Iraq Team, Africa/Middle East Division, Research and Analysis Directorate, US Army Intelligence and Treat Analysis Center. It has been coordinated with FSTC, AFMIC, HQ-TRADOC, MSIC, and the Army Staff. Informal coordination has been done with DIA. Interpretation of intelligence information in this publication represents the views of USAITAC and may be subject to modification as a result of subsequent information. All comments and suggestions should be addressed to Commander, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, ATTN: IAITAC-RMC, Building 213, Washington Navy Yard, Washington DC 20374-5085. Use of DA Form 2028 is required when identifying corrections or additions. Requests for copies of this document should be coordinated as directed in AR 381-19. Intelligence Dissemination and Production Support. Executive Summary Framing the Future Predictions made for future military developments beyond 5 years cannot rely on a mere extension of current weapons procurement practices or mainlining the existent force structure with minor adjustments. A country's security environment changes in response to evolving threats to its national interests. As it adapts to the new threats, or makes changes to meet evolving national security objectives, the military will alter its internal structure and enhance different branches of its armed forces. To provide a framework for assessing how the Iraqi military will evolve, three distinct security environments were developed. The security environments have the necessary flexibility to reflect Iraqi adaptations of its defense policies to cope with a more capable Iranian military and to develop the necessary forces for the regaining of Kuwait and selected areas of Saudi Arabia. the Treat environments are outlined below: - From 1993 to 1997, the Iraqi military will be preoccupied with containing Kurdish and Shiia insurgencies and repairing the immediate damage done by the Gulf War; economic sanctions will be lifted in 1994; since the insurgencies are currently ongoing, a scenario was not developed to establish requirements; Iraq was adjudged to be capable of eliminating the Kurdish insurgent movement once the UN removes its protection over the sanctuary areas - From 1997 to 2006, the Iranians will be the threat benchmark that Iraq will have to measure its capability against; the priority for defense monies and scientific talent will be allocated or the development of nuclear weapons and SSM delivery systems; Iraq will have to establish, as a minimum, a deterrent capability to prevent Iran from being the sore, Persian Gulf nuclear power; secondary areas for modernization will include improving the quality of the air force, an enhanced national and tactical air defense capability, and ground force modernization focused on the republican Guard (RGFC) and Regular Army heavy divisions; the Iranian threat and the Iraqi response will have many of the same characteristics of the war they fought in the 1980s. - The Iranians will have improved capability for fire support and more heavy divisions - The Iraqis will exploit every geographic advantage to aid in the construction of defensive obstacles and fighting positions; the engineer effort to improve defensive works along the border is an economy of force measure to help free Iraqi forces to conduct counterattacks and to defend key areas in depth; area defense ill be used to control, stop, or channelize the attacker and mobile defenses to strike and defeat the enemy's committed forces - Iraq will benefit from interior lines and being able to fight from well constructed defensive positions in depth - The iraqis will exploit the inherent mobility of their RGFC and the Regular Army heavy divisions to contain and push back any Iranian penetrations - From 2006 to 2013, the Iraqis will concentrate their modernization efforts on attaining the capability to retake Kuwait and on seizing the northern portion of Saudi Arabia that includes King Khalid Military City, the Tapline Road, and Rash al Khafji; once gains are consolidated. Iraq will move quickly to seize the coastal region south to Dahran and threaten Riyadh; modernization efforts will be focused on the ground forces with particular attention on tactical air defense, logistics, C3I, tanks, and armored personnel carriers; the intent to regain Kuwait and render Saudi Arabia unsuitable for coalition reinforcement represents the most dangerous future; this extreme view was developed to establish a series of signposts that identify the necessary force adjustments needed to be undertaken to adopt this step; a detailed scenario was developed to portray the Iraqi attack. Recovery From Failure Background. the Iraqi's military performance in the Gulf War, thankfully, did not live up to pre-conflict assumptions that it was an efficient, battle-hardened force. At the end of the war we were left with resonant images of long columns of disheveled, Iraqi prisoners and the material wreckage along the rad north of Kuwait City, known as the "highway of death." The key question is the Iraqi Armed Forces a poisoned chalice that is incapable of effectively using the weapons they have or of conducting effective combined arms operations? To help answer that question it is useful to revisit the june 1967 War between Israel and its principle protagonists--Egypt, Syria, and Jordan--and then contrast that conflict with the greatly improved Arab performance in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Similarities to the Past. Like the Gulf War, the june 1967 War left the observer with powerful images of Arab military ineptness. The wreckage of Egyptian columns caught by Israeli aircraft in the Mitla Pass and soldiers throwing their boots away and fleeing into the desert are remarkable similar to the scenes of the Iraqi Army in defeat. Both ground campaigns were brief, lasting approximately 100 hours, and both left similar questions over the ability of Arab armies to cope with the modern battlefield. Prior to the June 1967 War and the Gulf War, the Egyptian and Iraqi armies were rapidly expanded without the time for any meaningful training to take place or the establishment of internal unit cohesion. This expansion seemed to be more of a political statement than a reasoned military response. Iraqi units were sent to the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) with tanks with the wrong kind of ammunition and vague guidance over whom to report to, or what their mission was. Interrogations of captured Iraqi senior and junior officers indicated that they did not believe that the war would occur and that Sadddam would emerge with a cheap victory. In the case of both wars, the Iraqis and Egyptians entered into them carried more by emotion and faith in big numbers tan with a carefully crafted plan. Reform and Retribution. the results of the 1973 Yom Kippur War presented another image of the Arab soldier. The Egyptians surprised the Israelis by not only being able to cross the Suez Canal, in broad daylight, but also by withstanding Israeli armor counterattacks using infantry armed with ATGMs and RPGs. the innovative engineering techniques used by the Egyptians allowed them to quickly breach the 60-foot sand berm built on the bank of the canal and move heavy armored formations across the 100-meter wide Suez Canal. Although the Egyptians would later have their bridgehead int he Sinai flanked by the Israelis and the Third Army's bridgehead in danger of being cutoff, the improvement in combat efficiency between the army of 1967 and the one of 1973 makes for an interesting case study in a Arab army's ability to adapt. Listed are some of the major reasons for this improvement in performance. - Appointment of a charismatic and dynamic leader to prepare the army for the retaking of the Sinai: LTG Saad El Shazly; appointed as Chief of Staff to the General Headquarters, LTG Shazly focused a great deal of effort on rebuilding the trust between officers an soldiers and laid particular emphasis on ensuring his subordinate commanders trained and developed the individual soldier; he than constantly moved among his subordinate units checking on progress - tough realistic training with numerous live-fire exercises and extensive use of training simulators, particularly for the SAGGER ATG gunners; soldiers were encouraged to offer suggestions for improvements in techniques and equipment; one imaginative suggestion, provided by a junior officer, critical to the initial success of the operation was the use of fire hoses and high- pressure water pumps to breach the sand berm along the Suez Canal - Undertaking an objective assessment of the weaknesses associated with the army vis-a-vis the capabilities of the Israelis and modifying plans and training accordingly. The key component of the initial successes of the Egyptian Army was not based on technology but rather on the efforts of well- trained and motivated soldiers. Subsequent failure occurred when the Egyptians were unable to adapt to changing battlefield circumstances. They had planned for the Canal crossing, but were not properly prepared to exploit their success. Nonlethal Force Improvements Components of Combat Efficiency. Acquisition of improved or more capable armored vehicles, fire support systems, attack helicopters, etc., will not result in a substantial improvement in Iraqi battlefield performance unless accompanied by a corresponding commitment to increase their efficient use on the battlefield. The coefficients of greater battlefield effectiveness needed to exploit the improved capabilities of new weapons acquisitions include: improved tactical communications, target acquisition and battlefield surveillance systems that can see beyond 60km, realistic field exercises, increased use of training simulators, and greatly improved logistical procedures including the procurement of transport vehicles with high mobility. The most significant reform necessary is the rebuilding of unit cohesion, with particular emphasis on the establishment of trust and mutual respect among the officers and soldiers. This will be most difficult to attain because it engenders suspicion among the ruling elite. Impact of Geography. the Iraqis possess a very distinct geographic advantage for the conduct of operations against Kuwait City and the Saudi Arabia. They are not limited to an attack form the area of Bashra, south to Kuwait City and the Saudi Arabian border. They may attack form the west and then continue the assault in a southeasterly direction toward Ras al Khafji. And additional option is a supporting attack on Hafar al Batin and King Khalid Military City. The Iraqis can introduce forces more quickly onto the battlefield than can the Coalition. The combination of these two factors make improvements in the Iraqis' ability to surveil the battlefield in depth, visibility out beyond 50 to 60 km, and to logistically support heavy corps operations that facilitate the conduct of nonlinear deep operations more dangerous to regional foes. they will be better able to efficiently use their heavy forces on the battlefield. Material acquisitions that support improvements in either of these areas need to be carefully monitored. Two Armies. Maintaining two separate organizations, the RGFG and Regular Army, to conduct ground offensive operaitons has a corrosive ijpact on reform and military effectness. The creation of an elete, loyal force armed with the best weapons is characteristic of totalitarian regimes. However, in the case of Iraq the number of divisions in the RGFC is excessive. The higher pay, better equipage and presitve haracteristic of the RGFC puts the main body of the Iraqi military, the Regular Army, in second- class status. Concentrating the most capable systems and personnel in units whose primary pupose is regime protection helps limit the circumstances in which they would be committed to battle because if the elite units were defeated, the regime would fall. Reducing the size of the RGFC would be a significant step toward increasing the overall cpapbility of the ground forces. Weapons Procurement Systems Mix. the Iraqi military has a wide varieity of equipment from several different countries. forexample, their artillery park has a mix of 11 differnet towed 152mm and 155mm guns that use different ammunition, spare parts, and most importantly, have varyuing capabilites. This one example hlps illustrate a larger porblem the Iraqis currently have: a wide mix of sustms within each battlefield operating system, each with different capabilites and oerational limitations. This also makes miataining the equipment trainig operators, and providing logistic support complicated. Outlined are the general characteristics of their weapons procurement process: - Additional equipment is procured rather than establishing support programs to keep existing systems operational and fully functional on the battlefield - Procurement is focused on acquisitions rather than on developing programs that integrate existing systems with more modest aquisiitons - Buying a wide array of systems from different countries makes training, maintenenace, and the keeping of suffiicent sapre parts inventories difficult and cumbersome - Equipment is procured with little regard to how its capabilities or limitaitons affect current doctrine. Impact of National Programs. the desire of Saddam to crate a nuclear weapons program, extended-range ballistic missiles, and chemical and biological weapons absorved a large percentage of Iraq's available material and intelliectual cpapbility. The return on the Gulf War battlefieid was minimal. regime concern wover the Iranian nuclear effort will continue to give impetus to continuation by the Iraqis of their own program. However, the resources devoted to it will slow modernization in other areas. Use of Objective Requirements The arms procurement practices and continued emphasis on the muclear program descrived help mitigate against the Iraqis making the most out of monies invested defense. Arms procurement policies need to be changed. Rather than replicate the the ratyher chaotic Iraqi alpproach to procurment, objective requirements for chateristics of weaposn systme, or specific shtems, are identified int he BDP that meet thier requirtements for each battlefield oeprqaing system. Objectiviety was introdu ed by placing thge Iraqi military in a series of threat enviroments agains t specific opponents throughout the develpement plans' period of coverage. The Iraqis may choose to follow the path projected or not address it at all. If a deficieny identified by the study is not fixed then it becomes an explitable weakness. The use of objective requirements hleps establish some relative values to Iraqi procurements. The money and the bureaucratic skill needed to refurbish the military is not inexhaustible and real improvements will have to be the result of a more sophisticatged approach to force modernization. ----------------------- TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Executive Summary List of Illustrations List of Abbreviations and Acronyms List of Place Names Chapter 1. National Military Policy and Military Doctrine Key Judgements 1-1. Introduction 1-2. Threat Perceptions 1-3. National Policy Development and Effects on the Military 1-4. Military Doctrine 1-5. Future Developments 1-6. Strengths and Vulnerabilities Endnotes Chapter 2. Force Structure Key Judgements 2-1. Introduction 2-2. Ground Forces 2-3. Air Force 2-4. Air Defense Forces 2-5. NavaL and Coastal Defense Forces 2-6. Future Developments 2-7. Strengths and Vulnerabilities Endnotes Chapter 3. Force Generation Key Judgements 3-1. Introduction 3-3. National Military Objectives and Reserve Units 3-4. Mechanics of Mobilization 3-5. Reconstitution of Army Reserve Component Units 3-6. Forecast Reserve Unit Organization and Equipment 3-7. Methods of Mobilization 3-8. Mobilization Timeliness 3-9 Conscription 3-10. Manpower Mobilization Pool 3-11. National-level Alert System 3-12. Civil Defense Training 3-13. Strengths and Vulnerabilities Endnotes Chapter 4. Special Topics: Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Warfare Key Judgements 4-1. Introduction 4-2. Nuclear 4-3. Biological 4-4. Chemical Endnote SPECIAL TOPICS: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE Key Judgements [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the War with Iran and against the Kurds shows it is willing to use this cpapbility as a combat multiplier. 4-1. Introduction a. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] b. Following the Gulf War, UN inspection teams conducted inspections of the Iraqi NBC programs in support of UN Resolution 687. The multinational UN inspection teams have been harassed, intentionally deceived, and in several instances, denied access to facilites or documents deemed essential to detgermining the extent of Iraqi resarch and development. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] c. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] 4-2. Nuclear a. Background (1) General. Iraq estrablished its program in the late 1960s when it acquired its first nuclear facilites. Later, in the 1970s, Iraq was unsuccessful in negotiations with France to purchase a plutonium production reactor similar to the one used in France's nuclear weapons program. In addition to the reactor, Iraq also wanted to purchase the reporcessing plant needed to recover the plutonium produced in the reactor. Even through these requests were denied, France agreed to build the Osirak research reactor along with associated laboratories. The Osirak reactor was destroyed by an Israeli air strie in 1981. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (2) Future Prospects (a) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (b) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (c) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] b. Possible Delivery Options (1) Missiles (a) Background. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (b) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] The Iraqis are expected to acquire a SSM capability to deliver a nuclear warhead, but serious efforts cannot begin until UN inspections are ended at an unknown future date [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (c) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (2) Aircraft (a) Background. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (b) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (3) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] c. Future developments (1) 10-Year Forecast [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] (2) 15-Year Forecast [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ] 4-3 Biological a. Background (1) General [(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)] revealed an extensive fermentation capability, a sophisticated biological weapons research effort, and a network of facilities with the capabiolity for dual use. (2) [(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)] (3) [ (b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)] b. Utility. Biological agents, though generally slower acting, van be effective in smaller doese than chemical agents. Bolulinum toxin can kill with a few milliionths of a gram. Symptoms do not occur for at least 12 hours, with death occuring days later. The idsadvantage with using this toxin is that it degrades within hours in sunlight. Bacillus anthracis dispersed as spores, can cause pulmonary anthrax after inhalation. The spores are hardy and can remain viable in the soil for years. These two agents can be defeated by protective makss, vaccines, and sanitiation measures. However, field detection devices are not available for BW agents and samples need to be subjected to examination to determine the presence of a toxin or pathogen. The combination of the general characteristics discussed makes BW an excellent weapon to use against a target population that does not possess protective equipment or has not been inoculated. To have use on the battlefied, the time between exposure and the onset of dilapidating affects needs to be carefully integrated into the overall scheme of maneuver. Three practical advantages exist for the Iraqis to continue investing in developing and maintaining a credible BW capability: -- Fear of retaliation makes it possible to deter BW use against Iraq by another regional power -- BW weapons serve as an alternative to nuclear weapons -- Having BW requires potential oppponents to expend resources into taking appropriate countermeasures. c. [(b) (1) sec. 1.5.(c)] d. Future Developments (1) 10-Year Forecast [(b) (1) sec. 1.5.(c)] (2) 15-Year Forecast [(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)] (3) 20-Year Forecast [(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)] 4-4 Chemical a. Background (1) General [(b) (1) sec. 1.5.(c)] (2) The Iran-Iraq War. In 1982, early in the war, the Iraqis used riot control agents to rpel Iranian attacks. In mid- 1983, mustard agents were used and , im March 1984, Iraq was the first country to use a nerve agent in war, "tabun." Subsequently, the Iraqis used the nerve agents sarin and GF. [(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)] b. Types of Agents [(b) (1) sec. 1.5.(c)] After the Gulf War, in compliance with UN R4esolution 687, the Iraqis admitted to having sulfur mustard blister agent and nerve agents: sarin (GB), tabun (GA) and GF. They admitted having done research on the nerve agents soman (GD) and VX and acknowledged a phosgene production facility used for conventional military explosives production. [(b) (1) sec 1.5. (c)] c. [(b) (1) sec 1.5 (c)] d. [(b) (1) sec 1.5.(c)] e. Employment of Chemical Weapons [(b) (1) sec 1.5. (c)] (3) Agent Delivery Capability [(b)(1) sec. 1.5. (c)] f. Projected Capability [(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)] Endnote 1. On 3 April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which outlines the requirments that Iraq must meet so that the formal ceasefire can continue. A key component of the resolution is the requirement that Iraq agree unconditionally to the internationally supervised elemination of its weapons of mass destruction. This includes all chemical and biological weapons, stocks of agents, and all research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities associated with thrse programs. A similar prohibition exists for thre acquisituion and development of nuclear weapoins. All ballistic missiles with ranges greater that 150 km are also prohibited.
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