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File: 123096_br001_00a_0001.txt
Page: 0001
Total Pages: 1

SUBJECT:  EXTRACT FROM THE 100 HOUR GROUND WAR





                              Extract from 
                        The 100 Hour Ground War:
                        How the Iraqi Plan Failed

                              G2, VII Corps


~The decision, when and where to use chemical weapons, comes from the
highest level of the government.~

- Artillery Forward Observer,
    [b.6.] Mech Inf Div

.

~ Several senior Iraqi officers stated chemical munitions would not be used
against Coalition forces out of fear of large scale retaliatory strikes by
Coalition forces.88 Others believed that the Iraqis did not employ chemical
munitions because their own forces were severely under-equipped to survive
or operate in a chemical environment.89 Some sources argue that the Iraqi
artillery and indirect fire systems were so severely attrited by G-day that
they could not coordinate or come close to massing their artillery fire to
achieve any significant

8 7 Ibid .

88 op. cit., MSG, 202nd MI 8n, Joint Interrogation Facility-West ~JIF-W),
Subj: Artillery Training; Use of Chemical Rounds, cite ~0207-91, undated.
Iraqi division level artillery units are capable of delivering chemical
munitions. However, the commander has no authority to use them. Employment
of chemical munitions are monitored by an officer from the i~pecial
transportation unit.

89 Ibid. Several Iraqi PWs captured did not possess protective masks or any
type of chemical protective garments. Some Iraqi soldiers hid what little
food and/or personal belongings they had in their empty mask carriers.

_                               42

c~S ~


~Iraqi doctrine states that if a chemical round is received, it must be
fired that same day.~

- Staff officer,  [b.6.]    Inf Div

f . __ Iraq ' s non-use of chemicals . The Iraqis possess many chemical
delivery systems, including aircraft sprayers, bombs and missiles, multiple
rocket launchers, artillery (from 122mm and larger) and possibly mortars and
RPG-7 rockets. However, no chemical weapons were used in the KTO and no
chemical rounds were found in captured munitions stockpiles. There are
several possible explanations for this, the most likely being Baghdad's fear
of US and multinational Coalition forces retaliation for the use of the
chemical weapons. Interrogations of senior Iraqi officers revealed they
"...were unanimous in their assertion that there was no intent to employ
chemicals, and that there were no chemical munitions issued to their
divisions. Most believed that Saddam Hussein recognized that President Bush
would react in a manner unacceptable to Iraq if it employed chemicals. None
of the commanders expressed any misgivings about their inability to employ
chemicals; most regarded them as a bigger threat to (their own) poorly
equipped Iraqi soldiers.1'l22


~ The Iraqi commanders' fear for their own poorly equipped troops is well
founded. Many Iraqi soldiers only had masks, but no protective
overgarmentsl26 and there were complaints about the poor condition of
decontamination kits.127 Many mask filters hadn't been changed in years and
several units reported that their vehicles' chemical filtration systems were
broken.128
~ Some US and Allied intelligence officers speculate that even if the enemy
had chemicals and permission to use them, its lack of targeting intelligence
and its degraded fire control systems would have prevented the massing of
chemical fires on rapidly moving Coalition units.129



Regraded: Unclassified
Authority: DOD DS/DS Guidelines
By: ARCENT (3rd Army) G2
Date:  20 May 94


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