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File: 082696_d50033_010.txt
Page: 010
Total Pages: 16

                                                       ~FTER flCTION


                             ITEM:  Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)

                             O8SERV~TIDN:  ~ircraft utilizing aircraft siting ordnance aiming
                             systems were largely inefficient relative to aircraft capable of
                             utilizing precision guided munitions.

                             DISCUSSION:  One' of the most successful aspects of the Desert
                             Stortn air campaign was the use of precision-guided munitions
                             against tactical targets.  The tactical aircraft utilizing laser
                             guidance systems, F-iS Strike Eagle, F-16 L~NTIRN, F-18 Hornets,
                             ~-6 I-ntruder, F-ill Pave Track scored consistently higher BD~s
                              han aircraft not so equipped   By way of example, (2) ~-6s
               `~~~carryin'g (2) MK-84 LG8s surgically destroyed 3 of 4 wings of a
                             multistory building without collateral damage to a hospital
            - ~ ~~located within 2500 feet compared to a 8-52 droping (54) MK-82
  * ~`i~--- ~%)~~`g~~~~~ bombs on a known vehicle concentration with no
               - - -,,        econdaries noted.  (2) F-15 Strike Eagles `buddy-lasing' dropped
                              16) MK-82 LGBs and destroyed 12 confirmed tanks versus (4) F-18s
                             - ich dropped 30 MK-~ unguided'bombs and confirmed I artillery
                             tube destroyed.   These (2) examples of the published BD~ reports
   -~       -    -~-are indicative of the trends noted by target operations officers
               --            -`during the Gulf War. The Coalition Forces had 5 months to
                 *-stockpile ordnance in preparation for the ~ir Campaign yet the
    ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Kuwaiti ~ir Force, non-guided bombers, stopped flying for 1 1/2
   -3            -            ays until bomb resupply from the U~S. Navy was accomplished.
                             -The US~F ~-1Os, when using iron bombs, required emergency bomb
               A              eplenishment after 4 weeks.  Due to the stable lasing platform
  -`                         requirement air superiority is a given requirement.  ~dditionally
               -¾` the clear air desert environment in the early stages of the war
                             provided optimum lasing conditions.

                             LESSONS LE~RNED:  The distinct possibility of large scale bomb
                             supply depletion existed had the war become a protracted affair.
            -~ -,            Unguided munitions are the weapon of choice in a high threat,
                             distorted, tactical battlefield.  Precision- guided munitions,
                             battlefield condition permitting, must be the weapon of-choice to

  - - ""k!ffi' ,~)~.`maximize         efficiency and effectiveness.
                 - RECOMMEND~TIONS:            That MCRD~C' perform a cost/benefit analysis of
                             self designating PGM system and aggressively seek to acquire an
    - ------------------------ appropriate system for USMC aircraft.

                             COMMENTS:  The Marine Corps' only platform capable of self-
                             designated PGM delivery, the f;-6E, is being phased out of our
                             inventory.  ~ capability similar to the F-ill Pave Track or
                             F-15E/F-16 L~NTIRN (with target pod) would pay large dividends on
                             future operations.


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