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                                          ~FTER ~CTION REPORTS


                  ITEM: -Strategic Bombing ~ssets


                  O8SERV~TION:    The MEF pushed hard for B-52s in support of its
                  targeting ob~ectives, then scrambled to find appropriate targets
                  when allocated sorties.    This is diametrically opposed to
                  accepted platform selection/weaponeering principles, and
                  inappropriately interferes with the "mission type    orders given
                  the 3F~CC to prosecute the air campaign.


                   ISCUSSION:    Given the rest&ictive tactics used, the Circular
                --`Error Probable (CEP), or accuracy, of a 8-52 was lOOOft -
                .~under- ideal conditions.   There is documented proof of many B-52s
       -* -~~` - ]ftbombing sand.  B-52s release ordnance based on computer-generated
a= -~~.            avigational data.    They rarely, if ever, see their target, nor
           -~     *is visual acquisitio~a requfrement for 8-52 missions.    They do
                   equire ~~se target location data, preferably in GEODETIC vice
                   EOGR~PHIC coordinates.    In cases where the target is
                                       in an elongated pattern on the ground, the

          ¼?t'?½j~:azumith orientation is also required to plan the bomb run.
                   dditional problems were experienced with the political
                -visibility of 8-52 support and "interference" by senior off icers.
              ~~.~Requests,were frequently made for B-52 support, driven by senior
       -` `~    -           stated desires, when in fact the target, or desired
                  effect on target, was- not reasonably achievable by 8-52s (e.g.
              *~"`:J nly~Mk82 and Mk117 bombs were. available in B-52 packages), or
                  there were better platforms available to achieve the desired
                     ect.  This demand for a specific platform limited the ~F~CC in
                     ching the best ordnance and platform to the target, or in
          A     ~.utiliz.ing all his assets to fight the overall war.


              `~.~!LESSONS LE~RNED:   When requesting JF~CC support, platform and
                   rdnance selection is best left to 3F~CC-staff planners based on
-.;-t~-  ~` - -   - arget composition and desired effect.


          *       RECOMMENDED ~CTION:    That the Warfighting Center develop, for use
                  of commanders and planners, an SOP or Operational Handbook for
                  the request and appropriate use of non-Marine Corps air assets.
                  Recommend consultation with Navy Strike Warfare Center, VX-5,
                  Navy and ~ir Force Fighter Weapons Schools, and other appropriate
                  agencies in the development of this handbook.

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