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File: 082696_d50033_015.txt
~FTER ~CTION REPORTS
ITEM: Component Staff Geographic Separation
OBSERV~TIO~: During Desert Shield/Desert Storm the MEF commander
elected to place his headquarters close to the troops' outside
Riyadh. 4dditionally, the 3d M~W headquarters was remote from
Riyadh, from the MEF Headquarters, and from its fixed wing
assets. This dispersion created a myriad of problems,
particularl? in targeting coordination with the 3F~CC.
*`1~'~$\~?tISCUSSION: Since U. S. ~rmy, U. S. ~ir Force, and allied
-- `$1{~7:'rr~ommanders were'located in Riyadh, the Marine Corps'
--responsiveness on- a variety of issues and situations was slower
-` han other' services. Specific,problem areas are addressed in
-. .- -seperate after actio~items. This item is deliberately general
*~ -to make this point: the need for a commander to be near his
aneuver units is not disputed; The trade-off is increased
`~::~%`,~Ai:~ ~;?-problems with coordination of activities among the components and
--""-----r'- ~-~with the theater staff. This Marine component element in Riyadh,
nd the liaison elements with other component staffs, must be
-` u 1 ly cognizant of the commander's ,objectives and intent, and
~- --must have the (limited) authority to speak for him when
~W~~t'~~c~onsultation is not possible or operationally practical.
-f--'~-k
- -
- `. ~~;t'-'~~LESSONS
LE~RNED: When the commander elects not to co-locate his
dquarters with the CINC in joint operations, he-must ensure
he has-a full, well-equipped and organized staff to represent
-½ ~~~%%?;,\k.4$him wi,th the-CINC and other component headquarters.
c,;
--- ~:;` - :~RECOMMENOED ~CTION: That the Warfighting Center develop a
- -- *- - Concept of Operations and notional T/O and T/E, for adequate
-- ff liaison elements when the Marien component headqaurte~s is
-- -- -- not co-located with other headquarters.
COMMENTS:
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