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the operational control of the 7th Fleet commander.  Eventually
there were two of these commands, Special Landing Force Alpha and
Special Landing Force Bravo.  Each of these, generally known as
an SLF, consisted of a battalion landing team (with a logistic
element)  and a transport helicopter squadron. Each SLF was,  in
fact,  equivalent to a Marine Expeditionary Unit. They existed to
meet the requirements of contingency plans in the Western Pacific
and to conduct amphibious combat operations in South Vietnam.

   (2)  The SLFs did not make major contributions to the
prosecution of the Vietnam War.   The root cause was the
excessive,  inflexible insistence by the 7th Fleet and Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific on rigid adherence to approved amphibious
doctrine.   For example, doctrine dictated the establishment of an
amphibious operation area (AOA)  in which all air and ground
forces employed would come under the control of the amphibious
task force commander.   Such demands were inappropriate to the
tactical situation in South Vietnam.   American Army division and
corps commanders, as well as Air Force commanders, all of whom
had ground and air control systems in place on the ground, saw no
point to such disruptive measures just to bring a single
battalion ashore.

   (3)  In the same vein, American commanders engaged in "winning
the hearts and minds11 of the South Vietnamese people could not
support the traditional naval gunfire preparation of landing
zones.    Too many friendly South Vietnamese civilians would
suffer.

   (4)  The end result was that the SLFs became unwelcome in all
a~eas of South Vietnam except the III MAF area of responsibility.
Even that command considered the SLF to have value primarily as a
source of emergency reinforcements which did not count against
the ceiling on troop strength.   Other than such emergency
reinforcement operations, the many SLF landings in III MAF
territory seldom achieved more than walks in the sun.

e.   TRE "SINGLE MANAGEMENT" ISSUE

   (1)  Nothing in the Vietnam caused Marine commanders more
heartburn than "single management," the Air Force's rationale for
the control of Marine fixed-wing aircraft in South Vietnam.   Even
this dispute was couched in terms of inter-service rivalry as
much as it was towards seeking the best way to win the war.   In
this dispute, the Marine Corps had wins and losses, and most of
the latter were its own doing.

   (2)  Control of Marine fixed-wing aviation was a sensitive
issue from the beginning.   Marine commanders had not forgotten
the Korean War in which the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had been
under the operational control of the Air Force.   The arrangement
had provided, from the Marine viewpoint, poor close air support

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