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for the 1st Marine Division.

  (3)   The arrival of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in 1965
complicated the air situation in South Vietnam.  The previous
year, when the U.S. began air operations over Laos and North
Vietnam, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)
received authority from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CincPac)
to appoint the senior Air Force officer as the coordinator of
fixed-wing operations since both Navy and Air Force units were
involved.  When Marine squadrons reached Danang in 1965, CincPac
included them within the earlier directive.  The MACV commander,
however, wished to place these fixed-wing Marine squadrons under
Air Force control.

  (4)   CinCPac countered this with a directive on the conduct and
control of close air support in South Vietnam.   The directive
defined close air support as the primary mission of American
aircraft in South Vietnam, with the top priority going to those
ground units actually in contact with the enemy.   The directive
specified, however, that this did not counter the earlier
permission for the Air Force to act as coordinating authority for
tactical air support and air traffic control in South Vietnam.

  (5)   The MACV commander then issued new instructions of his own
on 13 July 1965.   The Air Force retained coordinating authority,
but III MAF also retained operational control of Marine aviation.
The instruction did require III MAF to notify the senior Air
Force command each day of the number of `1excess sorties'1
available for use outside the Marine t~ctical area.   The III MAF
commander, as the Naval Component Commander, also was responsible
for coordinating with the Air Force to ensure an integrated air
campaign.

  (6)   Marine and Air Force officers worked out an agreement
satisfactory to both parties.   The agreement gave the Air Force
the responsibility for air defense,  including operational control
of the Marines' Hawk antiaircraft missile units.   The Marines
retained control of its F-4B Phantom II aircraft since they were
dual-purpose planes capable of both air-to-air combat and close
air support.   The Marines  in turn, would allocate its excess
sorties to the Air Force.

  (7)   This agreement essentially gave the Marines autonomy in
providing close air support for III MAF and its subordinate
divisions.   It remained in effect until 1968.


         The allocation of excess sorties was not an easy effort.
The official history indicates that the 1st MAW found that III MAF
and the Air Force both wanted more sorties than were possible.  See
U.S.   Marines  in Vietnam:  The  Landin~ and  the  Buildu~,   1965
(Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,  1978) p. 152.

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