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the III MAF area.  He decided that tactical success required a
single air campaign.   General Westmoreland ordered his Air Force
component commander to take full control of the air war in South
Vietnam, including the allocation of Marine close air support
sorties.

   (14)  This action also encroached on sensitive inter-servic3e
issues.  Further, no ground commanders in northern South Vietnam
were happy with the close air support system instituted by the
Air Force.  It was too unresponsive to the ground combat
situation.  In the end,  "single management" evolved into a
compromise which resembled the 1965 agreement.  The Air Force
retained its single management authority, but delegated to the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing the responsibility for providing close
air support in northern South Vietnam.

   (15)  This situation highlights some joint issues which worked
for and against III MAF.  On the positive side (from the Marine
perspective), all Marine forces in South Vietnam were only under
the operational control of MACV.  Administrative command of these
Marine forces remained with the commanding general of Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific, whose headquarters was in Hawaii.   The
latter command also was, and is, a "type command" under the
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.  This meant that in many
instances III MAF had a direct channel to Hawaii which bypassed
Saigon.  This gave III MAF greater autonomy than other American
corps-level commands in South Vietnam.

   (16)  The other side of the coin was~XXIV Corps' direct
administrative access to Saigon, which bypassed III MAF.   This
relegated III MAF to a ~ro forma command of XXIV Corps and its
subordinate divisions,  including the 3d Marine Division.  On the
other hand, III MAF had administrative control over the latter
division, as well as the responsibility to provide it with
logistic support.

   (17)  These command relationships owed much to the Smith-vs-
Smith controversy of World War II.  In that affair, the Army
position was that the Marine commander on Saipan had not
authority to "relieve for cause" a commanding general of an Army
division.   In essence, the Army took the position that a com-
mander from one military component cannot relieve a commander
from another component.   This precedent kept General Westmoreland
from relieving the commanding general of III MAF for cause.
Nevertheless, the increasing emphasis on "jointness" may cancel
the precedent in some future conflict.

1007.   LESSONS LEARNED

a.   The Marine Corps, to borrow a term from biology and evolu-
tionary theory,  is "preadapted" for participation in joint
operations.   Its long, intimate association with the Navy; its

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