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  (8)   The agreement fell apart because the Marine command shot
itself in the foot by being too parochial.   Simply put, III MAF
provided adequate close air support to the Marine divisions under
its command, but failed to provide the same support to the Army
divisions transferred to its area and operational control in
1968.   At the height of the enemy?s Tet Offensive of 1968, MACV
sent Army divisions to reinforce III MAF.  When the MACV
commander, General William C. Westmoreland, visited III MAF
headquarters a few days later, he found that the Marine command
had made no effort to coordinate or provide close air support for
the Army divisions.   He angrily demanded immediate action, and
senior Army and Marine commanders worked out the necessary
arrangements within minutes.

  (9) The incident, which should never have occurred, had far
reaching effects.   While General Westmoreland respected Marine
fighting abilities, he had lost confidence in the ability of III
MAF to function as an effective corps-level headquarters.   In
response, he sent his deputy, Army General Creighton Abrams, to
establish a MACV Forward headquarters to control all tactical
operations in the III MAF area.   In essence, III MAF had lost its
authority as a headquarters.

  (10)   This was too strong an action for the commanders above
General Westmoreland.   It was an interservice issue equivalent to
the Smith-vs-Smith incident in World War II.   Further, it raised
questions of command relationships in joint operations which
senior commands did not wish addressed in the middle of the
Vietnam War.   At the same time, they did not wish to destroy
General Westmoreland's ability to prosecute the war.

  (11)   The resolution of the question involved a compromise.
General Abrams returned to Saigon and assumed his regular duties.
The cadre of MACV Forward remained in place but became the
nucleus of a new command, the XXIV Corps, under the command of an
Army general officer.   The new corps had operational control of
the fighting in the DMZ area, which was one of the most critical
areas and the scene of some of the toughest fighting of the war.
Coming under XXIV Corps were two Army divisions and the 3d Marine
Division.

  (12)   XXIV Corps was itself under the operational control of
III MAF, but it remained under Army administrative control.
That,  in effect, gave the XXIV commander direct access to General
Westmoreland.    The practical effect was that III MAF really
controlled only the Danang region.   Its ground forces consisted
of the 1st Marine Division and two Army divisions.   Its
administrative control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing also
continued.
  (13)   The latter command also figured in the other action taken
by General Westmoreland because of his unhappiness with events in

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