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out and supporting terrorist activities, capability to produce MRBMs and plenty of discussion of this aspect of
) Libya is probably also considering chemical agents indigenously. If, or the problem, However, the examples
whether it would be possible to utilize when, he succeeds in doing so, he will presented here indicate two factors
chemical weapons in its unconventional be able to pose a grave threat to his re- that reflect negatively on the prospects
warfare and terrorist operations. gional neighbors and to other states for meaningful control. First, national
There is little information available with interests in the Mediterranean and multinational export controls de-
on Libyan defensive equipment, but it and North Africa. signed to prevent the transfer of both
is likely that its Soviet-supplied equip- chemical and missile technology have
ment gives the Libyan armed forces at Conclusion not worked. These controls have mere-
least a passive defensive capability. (In It can be seen that in a remarkably ly made it harder and more costly for
other words, even if Libyan forces short period of time Syria, Iraq, Iran, governments to acquire the necessary
have not actively sought defensive and Libya have all been successful in technology and know-how. These re-
equipment, they probably possess at either moving toward or actually de- gimes have been able to buy the neces-
least limited stocks since it is standard ploying powerful CW forces. They sary goods and services from both
issue for Soviet units.) In 1987 the BND have all, to a greater or lesser extent, Western companies, usually through
reported that the Libyan Army had C'W overcome international controls on complex back channels, and Third
and NBC defensive units, and attempts the transfer of CW-related technology World suppliers who are rapidly erod-
have been made to purchase defensive and are en route to becoming self-suf- ing the dominance of Western suppliers
equipment from West Germany.35 ficient in the production of sophisti- in this market. Second, and perhaps
Despite all its efforts, Libya's CW cated agents and delivery systems. more importantly, it must be empha-
capability is very much in the embry- Both Iraq and Iran gained sufficient sized that these regimes have under-
onic stage. it has been severely handi- experience with CW operations dur- taken their CW programs in order to
capped by export controls imposed by ing the Gulf War to realize their po- meet what are to them very real and
the advanced nations. Furthermore. tency in a Third World conflict in pressing security needs. Barring, any
although it will soon have a signifi- which the participants are unlikely to amelioration in regional rivalnes or
cant offensive CW capability, it re- be able to afford costly, wide scale de- the arms race, there is no real incen-
mains questionable whether Libya is fensive measures. This operational ex- tive for them to give up what is a very
anywhere near achieving a compre- perience is being absorbed both by the effective military and internal security
` )iens,ive CW capability, that is, the combatants themselves as well as by weapon. It seems unlikely, therefore,
~ ability to fight in a full-scale CW envi- their various allies and customers that they would be willing to join any
ronment This may, however, merely worldwide. CW ban that may be negotiated in a
be a matter of time. In this article I have not touched conference on disarmament in Geneva.
All the indications are that Qaddafi upon the problem of control of CW US~MC
~inag~l. W~0erel(~jiRci~SJ Notes D. ~H~~~~j~)Ch~~1m10p~ nations. In the last the technical capa- ~~~1iio~i)a~)ic{l$~{{~e8~ii~
1. For a good overview of international bility to produce chemicals on an industri- 9. For a discussion of how terrorists
cW
decade, the industrial ological weapons, see McGeorge, "Chemi-
Defence Yearbook, 1989. developed nations have cal Addiction." Other experts have made
R. Gordon, "Egypt Ac- increased dramatically, both in terms of the point that chemical terrorism is not as
cused of Big Advance in Gas for War," New the size of these capacities and in their likely as is commonly supposed. See for in-
York Times, 10 March 1989; "Israel Em- technical sophistication. stance Raymond Zalinska, "Terrorism and
barks on Offensive Chemical Warfare Pro- 7. The steps by which proliferation gath- Biological/Toxin Weapons: Inevitable Al-
gram," Deftnse & Foreign Affiars Weekly, `2- ered pace, and the example presented by liance," Annual Meeting of the American As-
18 September 1989; Tony Hor'w'itz, "Israel's Iraq, are discussed in various sources. See sociation for the Advancement of Science, 14-
Enemies Develop Alarming Poison-Gas Anthony H. Cordesman, "Creating Weap- 16 January 1989.
Potential." Wall Stree' Journal, 15 Septem- ons of Mass Destruction," Armed Forces 10. Thomas Welch, Deputy Assistant to
ber 1988: Col Edgar O'Ballance. "Syria-Iraq- Journal international, February 1989; Har- the Secretary of Defense, "The Growing
Israel Chemical Warfare," Armed Forces, vey J. McGeorge, "Chemical Addiction," Global Menace of Chemical and Biologi-
April1988. Defense & Foreign Affairs. April 1989; Brad cal Warfare." Defense `89, July/August 1989
3. "Jordan Seeking Chemical Warfare Roberts, i7~eStrntegicimphcaflorn'ofChemi- 11. One prominent expert argues thai
Delivery Systems," Defrnse & Foreign Affaim' cal Weapons Proijeration. Draft Discussion this strategy would not really benefit the
Weekly, 23-29 January 1989. Paper for Carnegie Endowment Con- Syrians and is unlikely to be employed. See
"Agreement with lraq," Defense and lerence on Arms Control and the Prolifera- W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the
ament Henocles international, January tion of High Technology Weapons in the Middle East." Policy Focus 9, Washington
Near East and South Asia, 31 August 1989. 1nstitute for Near East Policy, December
,,,> 5. It did so by purchasing up to 50 CSS- 8. For discussions of the threat to lsrael 1988.
2 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) see: William Fowler, "The Middle East 12. Thorn Shanker, "West Under"'vrites
from China. Martin Navias, "Ballistic Mis- Chemical Threat," Defence, September 1987; Third World's Chemical Arms," Chicago
sile Proliferation in the Middle East," Sur- George D. Moffeti III, "israel: Determined Tribune, 3 April 1989; R~ Jeffrey Smith.
66 Ma~ne Corps Gazme July 1990
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