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        out and supporting terrorist activities,                 capability  to  produce     MRBMs     and        plenty of discussion of this aspect of
        ) Libya  is probably   also considering                  chemical    agents   indigenously. If, or        the problem, However, the examples
        whether it would be possible to utilize                  when, he succeeds in doing so, he will           presented  here   indicate   two factors
        chemical weapons in its unconventional                   be able to pose a grave threat to his re-        that reflect negatively on the prospects
        warfare and terrorist operations.                        gional neighbors and to other states             for meaningful control. First, national
           There is little information available                 with   interests in  the   Mediterranean         and multinational export controls de-
        on Libyan defensive equipment, but it                    and North Africa.                                signed to prevent the transfer of both
        is likely that its Soviet-supplied equip-                                                                 chemical and missile technology have
        ment gives the Libyan armed forces at                    Conclusion                                       not worked. These controls have mere-
        least a passive defensive capability. (In                   It can be seen that in a remarkably           ly made it harder and more costly for
        other  words,   even   if Libyan     forces              short period of time Syria, Iraq, Iran,          governments to acquire the necessary
        have   not   actively  sought    defensive               and Libya have all been successful in            technology and know-how. These re-
        equipment, they probably possess at                      either moving toward or actually de-             gimes have been able to buy the neces-
        least limited stocks since it is standard                ploying    powerful   CW     forces. They        sary goods   and   services  from  both
        issue for Soviet units.) In 1987 the BND                 have all, to a greater or lesser extent,         Western  companies,    usually through
        reported that the Libyan Army had C'W                    overcome    international    controls  on        complex  back    channels,   and Third
        and NBC defensive units, and attempts                    the transfer of CW-related technology            World suppliers who are rapidly erod-
        have been made to purchase defensive                     and are en route to becoming self-suf-           ing the dominance of Western suppliers
        equipment from West Germany.35                           ficient in the production of sophisti-           in this market. Second, and perhaps
           Despite all its efforts, Libya's CW                   cated   agents  and     delivery  systems.       more importantly, it must be empha-
        capability is very much in the embry-                    Both Iraq and Iran gained sufficient             sized that these regimes have under-
        onic stage. it has been severely handi-                  experience with CW operations dur-               taken their CW programs in order to
        capped by export controls imposed by                     ing the Gulf War to realize their po-            meet what are to them very real and
        the  advanced     nations. Furthermore.                  tency in    a Third   World    conflict in       pressing security needs. Barring, any
        although it will soon have a signifi-                    which the participants are unlikely to           amelioration in regional rivalnes or
        cant offensive CW capability,         it re-             be able to afford costly, wide scale de-         the arms race, there is no real incen-
        mains questionable whether Libya is                      fensive measures. This operational ex-           tive for them to give up what is a very
        anywhere near achieving a compre-                        perience is being absorbed both by the           effective military and internal security
`       )iens,ive CW capability,    that    is, the              combatants themselves as well as by              weapon.  It seems   unlikely, therefore,
~       ability to fight in a full-scale CW envi-                their   various allies    and   customers        that they would be willing to join any
        ronment This may, however, merely                        worldwide.                                       CW ban that may be negotiated in a
        be a matter of time.                                        In this article I have not touched            conference on disarmament in Geneva.
           All the indications are that Qaddafi                  upon the problem of control of CW                                                US~MC


        ~inag~l. W~0erel(~jiRci~SJ Notes D. ~H~~~~j~)Ch~~1m10p~  nations. In the last    the technical capa-      ~~~1iio~i)a~)ic{l$~{{~e8~ii~

         1. For a good overview of international                 bility to produce chemicals on an industri-        9. For a discussion  of how terrorists
        cW
                                                                                      decade, the industrial      ological weapons, see McGeorge, "Chemi-
                          Defence Yearbook, 1989.                                 developed nations have          cal Addiction." Other experts have made
                          R. Gordon, "Egypt Ac-                  increased dramatically, both in terms of         the point that chemical terrorism is not as
        cused of Big Advance in Gas for War," New                the size of these capacities and in their        likely as is commonly supposed. See for in-
        York Times, 10 March 1989; "Israel Em-                   technical sophistication.                        stance Raymond Zalinska, "Terrorism and
        barks on Offensive Chemical Warfare Pro-                    7. The steps by which proliferation gath-     Biological/Toxin Weapons: Inevitable Al-
        gram," Deftnse & Foreign Affiars Weekly, `2-             ered pace, and the example presented by          liance," Annual Meeting of the American As-
        18 September 1989; Tony Hor'w'itz, "Israel's             Iraq, are discussed in various sources. See      sociation for the Advancement of Science, 14-
        Enemies   Develop  Alarming  Poison-Gas                  Anthony H. Cordesman, "Creating Weap-            16 January 1989.
        Potential." Wall Stree' Journal, 15 Septem-              ons of Mass Destruction," Armed Forces             10. Thomas Welch, Deputy Assistant to
        ber 1988: Col Edgar O'Ballance. "Syria-Iraq-             Journal international, February 1989; Har-       the Secretary of Defense, "The Growing
        Israel Chemical Warfare," Armed Forces,                  vey J. McGeorge, "Chemical Addiction,"           Global Menace of Chemical and Biologi-
        April1988.                                               Defense & Foreign Affairs. April 1989; Brad      cal Warfare." Defense `89, July/August 1989
         3. "Jordan  Seeking Chemical      Warfare               Roberts, i7~eStrntegicimphcaflorn'ofChemi-         11. One prominent expert argues  thai
        Delivery Systems," Defrnse & Foreign Affaim'             cal Weapons Proijeration. Draft Discussion       this strategy would not really benefit the
        Weekly, 23-29 January 1989.                              Paper   for Carnegie    Endowment    Con-        Syrians and is unlikely to be employed. See
            "Agreement with lraq," Defense and                   lerence on Arms Control and the Prolifera-       W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the
           ament  Henocles  international, January               tion of High Technology Weapons in the           Middle East." Policy Focus 9, Washington
                                                                 Near East and South Asia, 31 August 1989.        1nstitute for Near East Policy, December
,,,>     5. It did so by purchasing up to 50 CSS-                   8. For discussions of the threat to lsrael    1988.
        2 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)                see:  William Fowler, "The Middle East             12. Thorn Shanker, "West Under"'vrites
        from China. Martin Navias, "Ballistic Mis-               Chemical Threat," Defence, September 1987;       Third World's Chemical Arms," Chicago
        sile Proliferation in the Middle East," Sur-             George D. Moffeti III, "israel: Determined       Tribune, 3 April 1989; R~ Jeffrey Smith.
        66                                                                                                                       Ma~ne Corps Gazme July 1990


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