ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BiBLIOGRAPHY                                          165

January.  To the west an Iraqi assault was defeated by the 1st Light Armor
Infantry (LAl) Battalion.  To the east the Iraqis attacked and seized the coastal
town of Khafii.  The town had been evacuated and abandoned by the Saudis
because of its close proximity to the border and the frequent enemy artillery
barrages into the city.  The sustainment of civilian casualties was unnecessary
and Khafji's citizens were temporarily relocated to safety. Tactically, the town
was undefended, with a defensive line established to the south of the city.  This
created a buffer zone between the Iraqis and the Americans and Arabs in which
any Iraqi advance could be engaged by supporting arms fire.   In essence, Khafii
became a trap, and the Iraqis fell for it.
   Prior to sunset on the day the Iraqis captured Khafii, we conferred with Arab
Coalition Force leaders to develop plans for a counterattack.   We advised Col
Turki, the Saudi brigade commander, and the Qatari commanders of proposed
actions, explaining that two Task Force Taro reconnaissance teams had remained
in Khafji to continue their intelligence collection tasks and engage the Iraqis with
artillery fire and air strikes. We offered that the Marine recon teams could re-
main undetected for 36-48 hours, but that thereafter their positions would
probably be compromised.
   For me, the Battle of Khafji involved one of the most difficult decisions I've
ever had to make.  As a Marine, as a leader of Marines, one waits a career for
such an opportunity to execute a major counterattack, to recapture an enemy--
seized objective, to validate months of arduous training and preparations in
actual combat.   It truly was the opportunity of a lifetime for a Marine.        I
believed in my Marines, and I was confident in our capabilities. But it was also
an opportunity for us as Americans to demonstrate our belief, our trust, our
confidence in the Arab Coalition Forces.
   Therefore, with MajGen Myatt's concurrence and support, we deferred to the
Arab Forces.   We encouraged them to be the main attack.       We accepted the
secondary role as the supporting force.       K10afji was in the Arab area of
operations, and for us to preempt the Arabs with an American dominated attack
would have been, at least in my opinion, counterproductive to the four months
of cross-training we had accomplished with the Arab Coalition Forces.   Khafji,
therefore, was truly an Arab victory.   It was a difficult decision to defer to the
Arab Forces, but it was the right decision.   The Battle of Khafji was a tactical
victory for the Arabs; it was a strategic victory for the Americans.
   Task Force Taro planning initiatives focused on the Saudi and Qatar forces
conducting the main attack with their armor and mech forces.      Concurrently,
American Marines would support the assault with antiarmor weapons systems
and infantry security forces as well as air-naval gunfire liaison teams. But, more
important, Task Force Taro would provide the supporting arms fire, primarily
artillery, as well as the critical air support.
   The plan agreed to, Col Turki ordered the attack.   Within hours the Saudis
and Qataris, with American Marine support, executed a night probing attack to
determine Iraqi Army unit dispositions and reactions within Khafji. Then, after
a planned withdrawal and the finalization of the plan, we counterattacked and
within 6 to 12 hours routed the Iraqi units in Kha?\i, recaptured the city, and