166                                  U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 199~199I


safely recovered the American Marine recon teams.      In the process, over 600
Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) were captured and over 90 Iraqi tanks and
armored personnel carriers were destroyed.
    The statistics, however, were secondary to the true consequences of the
Battle of Khafji.  To understand its true meaning, one must appreciate the pre-
ceding circumstances and situations.   At the time Col Turki courageously
announced, "We attack," the Iraqi Army was the fourth largest army in the
world. It was reported to be the most combat tested, experienced military in the
world as a result of its eight-year war with Iran.  Furthermore, in the vicinity
of Khafji, intelligence analysts estimated the Iraqis had approximately four to six
times the number of tanks we had and six to eight times the artillery pieces.
    Meanwhile the Saudi military had minimal experience in conventional battles
in modern times, especially ones with the technical and sophisticated weapons
on today's modern battlefield.  Similarly, the Qataris, to our knowledge, had
never deployed from their sovereign borders to participate in combat.      It truly
was a situation of David versus Goliath.   But in the Arab Coalition Forces'
slingshot was the support of the American Marines.       The mutual trust and
confidence among the respective forces ensured a crushing Iraqi defeat and a
crucial American and Arab victory. From that point on there was absolutely no
question regarding the courage and conviction of the Arab Coalition Forces.
    There were other consequences of the Battle of Khafji as well.       First, the
confidence and    morale of the Arab   Coalition Forces were enhanced         im-
measurably.   Second, we concluded that the Iraqi Army had no resolve.        We
advised Gen Myatt that if we hit the Iraqis hard and fast they would quit--and
quit early.  We surmised that the Iraqis had no desire to stand toe to toe and
engage in a slug-fest with a dedicated opponent.     Consequently, Gen Myatt
decided to pull battalions off the line and to assign them the principal task of
EPW collection and control.   This would contribute to a rapid and unimpeded
attack by Marine forces and free them from anticipated administrative and
logistical burdens.  Third, the Arab Coalition Forces requested a major mod-
ification to the ground campaign scheme of maneuver.    It was this third conse-
quence that proved critical to the subsequent assault into Kuwait and Iraq.
    Previously, the ground scheme of maneuver called for U.S. Marines to attack
north in the eastern and central portion of Kuwait.  The U.S. Army and British
and  French   forces  would also attack  north    from  positions    to  the west.
Meanwhile, the majority of the Arab Coalition Forces would follow in trace of
the attacking Americans and Europeans.    The American Marines would then
encircle Kuwait City and secure all entrances and exits to the city.  At this point
the Arab Forces would conduct a passage of lines and clear the city by
house-to-house and door-to-door fighting.
    But after the Battle of Khafji victory, the Arab command advocated that they
attack as equal partners with the American and multinational forces.     The Arabs
acknowledged that if the Americans were to breach the formidable Iraqi
defenses, they too would assault the barriers and attack on line with the Marines.
Therefore, this proposal resulted in the Arab Coalition Forces, primarily Saudi
and Qatari, attacking north in the eastern avenue of approach centered on the