WIrll THE 2D MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM                 11

he anticipated, and to move the division forward to the operating area as quickly
as possible in preparation for offensive operations.~ The latter intent proved
more difficult to do since it bad to be executed from the division's initially
assigned defensive missions. Nevertheless, at every opportunity, the division
displaced forward, so its elements were nearly continuously on the move over
a peri~d of two months.
    I MEF Fragmentary Order 006, dated 20 December 90, tasked the 2d
Marine Division with providing one battalion for the security of "critical
facilities" at Al Jubayl, and to prepare for offensive operations by 15 January
1991.~ On 25 December, General Keys took this opportunity to issue the
division's first order of Operation Desert Shield. The division's forward CP
would displace on 27 December and then coordinate the displacement of
subordinate units by echelon.~ By 7 January 1991, the division's main CP had
moved to the area known as the "Triangle," with other elements following.4 At
the same time, some of the division's units were still arriving in theater and
joining up with their equipment. On 17 January, the 2d Tank Battalion offloaded
its equipment and left Al Jubayl, the last unit to close the division.42 Even as this
battalion began to move up, the division was already taking its next stride across
the desert.
    On 9 January, 1 MEF issued Fragmentary Order 003 to I MEF Operation
Order 006, assigning the 2d Marine Division a mission to " defeat enemy forces
as far forward as possible and to protect vital facilities vice Al Jubayl......
The division was tasked to `1Defend in zone using supporting arms; screen to
west of EPAC TAOR to provide early warning of attack; . . . (and) establish
a forward operations base.......44 By  12 January the division issued a
complementary order, number 1-91, by which the division would displace to
11establish defensive positions in sector in order to protect Al Jubayl vital
facilities from indirect fire; . . . conduct local counterattacks to restore the MEF
zone; . . . (and) assist friendly units in rearward passage of     lines.'14~ The only
manner in which the division would be able to successfully conduct any
"counterattacks to restore the MEF zone" would be if it was positioned far to
the north. Such a move would not only help to fulfill this mission, but would
also be in keeping with General Key's intention to position the division as far
forward as possible in preparation for offensive operations prior to the start of
the planned air campaign.~ A move of 190 kilometers north would bring the
division to its next position near Al Kibrit, only 60 kilometers from the Kuwaiti
border.
    The division's forward CP arrived in the vicinity of Al Kibrit on 14
January. Once it was established, the main CP moved up, and established itself
even farther to the north. The main CP then called the rear CP to come up and
join with it. Other division elements arrived in the area during the next 10


    11Eastern Province Area Command Tactical Area of Responsibility11 which extended south
from the Kuwaiti border, and was bounded by the Persian Gulf coast to the east and, at this time,
by the 2d Marine Division to the west.