12                                    U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

days.47 While in this position, the 2d Light Armored Infantry (LAl) Battalion
was ordered to screen the division's western flank.~ The battalion would
continue to  lulfill this mission, screening the division's front and flanks
throughout the war.
    The division was  now   close enough to the Kuwaiti border to begin
preliminary offensive operations. Only days after the last elements arrived at
the new position, the division issued Frag Order 007, on 27 January 1991. This
ordered an "artillery surface raid," intended to destroy selected targets across the
border in what was known as the "agricultural area." The raid was conducted
by the 5th Battalion, 10th Marines. Batteries Q and R, armed with M109A1
155rnm self-propelled howitzers and Ml 14 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, were
selected as the firing units. The 2d LAl Battalion would provide screening and
securIty.
    The purpose of the raid was three-fold. First, to develop an offensive Spirit
in the division's units. Second, to destroy the targets chosen: a logistics site and
truck park. Third, and perhaps most importantly, to measure the enemy's
reactions to the raid and to gauge his ability to detect and counterattack the
division.50 The raid was structured as a Task Force, with Lieutenant Colonel
Keith T. Holcomb, Commanding Officer, 2d LAl Battalion, in charge. The
commander of the raid force was the commanding officer of the 5th Battalion,
10th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew F. Mazarra. Counterbattery protection
was provided by the counterbattery radar platoon of 10th Marines and Battery
A, 92d Field Artillery, a multiple launch rocket system battery commanded by
Captain Edward L. Hughes, USA.
    At 2100 on 27 January the batteries moved from their assembly areas to
their firing positions. At 2359 firing commenced and continued for 13 minutes.s
When firing ceased, Battery Q had delivered 72 155mm rounds and Battery R
had fired 36 8-inch rounds. The batteries displaced and returned to their
assembly areas. Throughout the fire mission, there was no attempt by the enemy
to return fire.S2 From this first combat mission, the 2d Marine Division had
begun to take the measure of the enemy. The impression began to grow of Iraqi
inability to bring accurate artillery fires against the division. This belief was
confirmed by subsequent actions.
    By the end of January, the division was planning to move forward into final
assembly areas, in preparation for its role in offensive operations as assigned by
the original  MEF   operation plan.   A  party from Headquarters Battalion,
commanded by the battalion executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel John W.


    Oceasionally, an officer's background and experience appear to have eminently qualified him
to hold a position of great responsibility during a particular crisis. One such officer was Lieutenant
Colonel Holcomb. Among his previous assignments, he served in Lebanon in 1978 to 1979 as a
UN observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Israeli Army. He had attended the
Naval Post-Graduate School, earning a master of arts degree in national security affairs, with a
Mideast emphasis. He had been a Commandant of the Marine Corps Fellow to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. At the Defense Language Institute he spent 47 weeks studying
the Syrian dialect of Arabic.