20                                  U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

belonged,to another III Corps operational reserve division, the 5th Mechanized
Division.
    General Keys learned of the enemy's materiel strength at every evening
briefing. Higher headquarters passed information about the numbers of tanks
and artillery pieces facing the division, providing a forecast of what the division
might have to face as it assaulted the Iraqi defensive lines. Shortly before
0-Day, there were reportedly 500 guns of various calibers which could fire on
the breach area. Of equal concern were the reports, often coming from EPWs,
that chemical munitions would be used against the division during its attack.
Artillery-delivered mustard gas was twice mentioned as the most likely agent to
be used, and these rounds were even reported to have been distributed at the
division level.~
    Because the enemy artillery so greatly outnumbered and outranged that of
the division, three days of clear weather were needed to allow the coalition air
forces to attack and destroy these prime targets.  Fortunately, just days prior to
0-Day, the meteorological section reported that a weather system known as an
"Omega High" was developing in the eastern Mediterranean, and would ensure
the fine weather so urgently desired.
    The ability and desire of the Iraqis to contest the division's attack was not
as easy to predict as the weather, however. Various units were reported as being
at 30- to 50-percent effectiveness, and the increasing numbers of line-crossers
indicated a severe lack of fighting spirit.73 Yet, if remaining enemy soldiers
chose to stand and fight,  and served any of the surviving guns with any
accuracy, the division's movement through the breach lanes could prove costly.
Nevertheless, General Keys remained highly confident. Shortly before 0-Day he
predicted that the division might have its most difficult period in getting through
the breach. But, once beyond, the division would be able to "hold our own and
get on," and that the "biggest problem would be the first three or four days. "74
This informal assessment was to be the most accurate forecast of all.

                            The First Skinnish

    At approximately 2100 on 29 January, the division engaged in its first
skirmish of the war.7S At first, several reports came to the division's combat


    In a telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Gregor on 11 September
1991, the work of the 0-2 section was describcd as "85- to 90-percent accurate" in identifying the
Iraqi brigades and their locations.

      With rocket assisted projcctiles, the division's ISSmm M198 howitzers had a range of
30,000 meters. The Iraqi Army had a variety of artillery pieces, many of which were typical
Soviet-manufactured 122mm and 152mm howit~ers, with ranges of 15,300 meters and 17,230
meters, respectively. However, the Iraqis had also procured more sophisticated weapons in some
quantities: the South African iSSmm G5 howitzer and the Austrian Noricum OH N-45 iSSmm
gun-howitzer. These weapons, using aerodynamically improved "base-bleed" projectiles, had
ranges of 39,000 and 39,600 meters, respectively.