`WITH THE 2D MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM             21


operations center (COC) of large groups of Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles
moving through the berm below the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, and heading south.
Such groups (the largest was originally estimated at 60 to 100) were reported at
several points along the fronts of 1st Marine Division, 2d Marine Division, and
the Eastern Province Area Command (EPAC). Most alarming to the division
were the reports coming in from Observation Posts 2 and 4, located close to the
Saudi-Kuwaiti border, of enemy armored vehicles entering the division's zone.
Because of the forward movements of the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions in
preparation for offensive Operations, these OPs were manned by elements of the
1st Marine Division and 1st Force Reconnaissance Battalion. These forces on
OP 2 were the first to engage the enemy, bringing the column under TOW
missile fire and calling in several air strikes.76
    At 2250, Company C, 2d LAl Battalion reported it had engaged 29 armored
vehicles.77 By 2345, the 2d LAl Battalion again reported that it was engaging
enemy armored targets, and claimed one kill of a tank by a TOW gunner,
Corporal Edmond Willis Ill of Company A.7S This was the 2d Marine Division's
first ground combat kill during Operation Desert Storm.
    General Keys was concerned with the possibility of an enemy breakthrough
into the division's zone. The 6th Marines, responding to an inquiry by the
general, stated that it could have an infantry battalion and a battalion of tanks
ready to move in 30 minutes.79 The Tiger Brigade (1st Brigade, 2d Armored
Division) was given a verbal order to provide one company to move forward
and defend the Direct Support Group.~ At 2341, General Keys personally
discussed the protection of the ammunition supply point with Brigadier General
Charles C. Krulak, commanding general of the Direct Support Group.8        By
2356, the Tiger Brigade unit was in place.82
    One other sighting of enemy vehicles was called in by the 2d LAl Banal ion.
At 0029, 30 January, the battalion reported another 29 vehicles moving through
the berm; however, it was uncertain if these were Saudi or Iraqi.8~ A call to the
MEF CP confirmed that these were Saudi, operating along the eastern boundary
of the division's zone. At 0116, the 1st Marine Division's Task Force Shepherd
reported that OP 6 was being fired upon; at the same time the 2d LAI Battalion
reported the Saudis were firing over their positions. Colonel Ronald W. Richard,
the division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, immediately called the MEF staff to
correct the situation.84 There now were also 20 vehicles on the north of the
border, heading south. These were engaged by the 2d LAl Battalion with air
support.85
    By 0220, the skirmish was over; the 2d LAl Battalion reported two tanks
destroyed, both hit by the same gunner, Corporal Will is.86 At 0550, the battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Keith T. Holcomb, reported that a 15-kilometer
gap existed ()n its left flank with the 1st Marine Division. The battalion was