WIrH THE 2D MARINE DIVISION TN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM                        23

more than 24 hours. By 2204, the MEF lowered the MOPP level to 2, and this
information was passed to those units concerned.~
    On both nights, the division command post gained much needed experience.
Marines on watch demonstrated a calm concentration and a quiet efficiency.
This smooth functioning was the result of considerable practice, exercise, and
professional competence. Probes by the Iraqis may not have led to a serious
engagement by the division, but they tested its command and control. The
experience and confidence gained here were to pay dividends in the weeks
ahead.

                    Development of the Operations Plan

    As the division trained for combat and moved forward to defensive positions
near the Kuwaiti border, the staff began developing its operations plan. it was
recognized that no matter what the division's objectives might be, or what
mission might be assigned to it, the ability to move into Kuwait and to fix and
defeat the Iraqi forces there would depend upon the ability to conduct a
successful breach of extensive enemy minefields and obstacle belts.
    The original plan for the MEF, as published by Headquarters, Marine Corps
Forces Central Command (MarCent) on 1 January 1991, tasked the 1st Marine
Division with conducting the breach of both Iraqi defensive lines in the area of
Al Wafrah. After breaching the second defensive line, the 2d Marine Division
would conduct a passage of lines, become the point of main effort and continue
the attack to the MEF objectives. A link-up operation with an amphibious
landing on the coast near Ash Shuaybah was also a possible task for the
division.@S
    Based upon these tasks, the 2d Marine Division made its plans, to include
training for the complex maneuver of a passage of lines.~ A movement plan
was designed to support an orderly and rapid passage through the breach created
by the 1st Marine Division. Under this plan, the times, routing, and procedures
of the division's regiments and other subordinate units were established.
    As planning for the operation continued, some members of the division staff
raised serious questions. The breach site selected was at one of the longest
points between the two defensive belts, a distance of about 20 kilometers. This
distance, coupled with a narrow front at the breach site, would restrict the
movement of the 1st Marine Division through the second breach, and keep it in
the zone between the defensive lines for an unacceptably long time.~ The 1st
Marine Division's own plans called for a decision to be made,               not later than


    It is possibic that the Iraqi attack on Khafji was a spoiling attack meant to disrupt the allies'
preparations for the offensive. The actions in the 2d Marine Division's zone would therefore have
been meant as an envelopment to cut off and destroy all those coalition forces between there and
the coast. Such an action would have been in keeping with Iraqi doctrine.  If such was their
intent, however, the thrust was shattered by the actions of the 2d LAl Battalion and the effective
use of air support, which destroyed over 60 Iraqi tanks and other vehicles during the two days of
this action.