usmcpersiangulfdoc3_034.txt
22                                        U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


ordered to refuse its flank, while the division sought approval to change the
boundary.57 This approval came at 0837.~
    After the action of the night of 29-30 January, General Keys decided to
move several combat units to positions northward, from which they could more
quickly respond to any further probes. He ordered 6th Marines to establish this
covering force. The 6th Marines shifted north with two battalions -- the 1st
Battalion, 6th Marines, and 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. Artillery Support would
be provided by the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines. A frag order also was issued to
the 2d Tank Battalion to place, on order, one company under the operational
control of the 6th Marines.59
    With these preparations made against the possibility of a repeat by the
enemy of the previous night's actions, General Keys left to visit the scene of the
skirmish. There he met with Lieutenant Colonel llolcomb and reviewed the
new dispositions with him. The remainder of the day passed in relative quiet,
but reports were received of heavy enemy columns moving to the north of the
division's zone and all along the Kuwaiti border. The 6th Marines, having
moved north, continued its mission of covering the division front and preparing
to counterattack any incursions. The 2d LAl Battalion, under the operational
control of the 6th Marines, would conduct the screen of the division's sector
south of the border.~~
    By 2000, 30 January, reports were received at the division COC of an
"imminent" attack in the 6th Marines' zone. Intelligence reports cited multiple
brigade-size units moving in the area north of the border. In the midst of this
news, at 2040, a message was received that a chemical attack in the 2d Marine
Division's area was probable, and personnel north of 28 degrees, 8 minutes
were to don chemical protective garments immediately. Intelligence sources
continued to send more reports of enemy movements. At 2050, 60 vehicles
were crossing the border within five kilometers of OP 3. At the same time, 74
tanks were reported moving in the area south of the border.9 At 2032, the MEF
directed that all personnel north of the Kibrit road were to go to MOPP (Mission
Oriented Protective  Posture)       level 3: all protective         clothing except the
gas-mask.~ General Keys personally passed this information on to the 6th
Marines. Throughout this time vehicle movement within southern Kuwait
continued to be reported to the COC. The largest such concentration reportedly
contained 170 vehicles near a cultivated area above the division's sector.~
    The anticipated enemy attacks did not occur, and at about 2200 it was
obvious that the Iraqi forces had been hurt and kept within the Kuwaiti border.
The only place the Iraqis were partially successful was in the Saudi sector,
where they entered the coastal town of Al Khafji and held portions of it for


    `The initial reports claimed two tanks killed by Corporal Willis. However, it was later
determined that the same tank had becn hit twice. The second timc apparently occurred while the
Iraqis were attempting to recover the vehicle; the movement was detected and the recovery vehicle
provided a thermal signature.  Believing that another tank was moving in fl~e area, it was fired
on and hit again.

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