wrrH THE 2D MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM            25

since August, and had personally reconnoitered much of the border area to the
I MEF front, and was therefore familiar with the land and the trafficability of
its various areas.~ This knowledge was put to use when the staff conceived a
recommendation to    execute a separate breach.  Lieutenant Colonel  Shores
suggested the vicinity of the Umm Gudair ojifleld. The area between the
defensive belts was narrower, only 4 to 6 kilometers, allowing a more rapid
advance through the belts. Trafficability to and through this area was considered
to be excellent. There was ample room for positioning the division west of the
border, prior to the assault.
    A review of the enemy's dispositions and the MEF's objectives indicated
that the creation of a separate breach site in this area would more rapidly
accomplish the missions of both the division and the MEF. With the 1st Marine
Division conducting its breach at the original site, it could link up with the
amphibious task force (ATF), or seize any ATF objectives, if necessary. Over
several weeks of planning, the designation of the MEF objectives changed
several times. As finally set, they were as follows: MEF objective A, Al Jaber
Airfield, in the 1st Marine Division's zone; MEF objective B, the key terrain
south of Al Jahrah, in the 2d Marine Division's zone; MEF objective C, Kuwait
City International Airport, in the 1st Marine Division's zone. These MEF
objectives oriented the MEF ground units to the force mission to conduct "a
supporting attack   to fix and  destroy Iraqi  forces in  zone;  to  prevent
reinforcement of Iraqi forces facing Arab Corps in the west; and to establish
blocking positions to preclude retreat of Iraqi forces from southeast Kuwait and
Kuwait City." The double-breach plan would require that the divisions exchange
zones as currently assigned; that is, the 1st Marine Division would be on the
east, and the 2d Marine Division would move around it to the west.1~
    General Keys was certain that he and his staff had found the best solution
to the problem of breaching the Iraqi defensive lines, not only for the division,
but for the MEF as well. The general now had to convince the Commanding
General of I    MEF,   Lieutenant General Walter E.  Boomer.    The greatest
foreseeable obstacle in effecting this change was that of time; the air campaign
had now been going on for about two weeks, and it was known that the ground
campaign was to begin very soon. However, it was also known that General
Boomer was flexible and would freely accept a better idea and ensure it was put
into action.
    This concept of breaches, conducted at two widely separated sites, was
proposed to General Boomer in a briefing during his visit to the 2d Marine
Division on 1 February. As a result of this briefing, he ordered the division to
plan for this separate breach. Accordingly, the division G-3, Colonel Richard,
provided initial guidance to the staff; it was to continue to coordinate the
training in breaching operations, to develop an appropriate concept of operations,
and to ensure that a feasible movement schedule was prepared to support the
plan.101
    At 2038 that day, the division activated its future operations planning cell,
headed by Lieutenant Colonel John K. Lynn. This cell was composed of
representatives from   several staff sections: fire support, air, intelligence,