26                                U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

psychological operations, medical, and engineers. The Tiger Brigade was also
represented. This first meeting identified some broad issues the cell would have
to resolve over the next three weeks. First, it was recognized that the new plan
would have to meet the MEF commander's guidance that the breaches be made
more rapidly than previously planned. Also, the change of zones would better
suit the respective tasks of the divisions. The 2d Marine Division9 having more
tanks, was best suited to meet the armored threat to the west. The 1st Marine
Division would face the urban fighting and clear the lines of communication on
the east flank. ~~
    Logistics, as always, was a critical issue. Questions arose over a variety of
supply and support matters. At a 2 February meeting, the group studied
requirements for fuel and water, and the location of division dumps to hold
these critical items. The same requirements existed for identifying the types and
amounts of artillery ammunition. The nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare
officer knew that his responsibility was to ensure that enough protective suits
were  sent forward to replace those which  would be  worn   and  become
contaminated. The identification of local water points was also important for
chemical defense, since these sources could be used for the decontamination of
men and vehicles without using scarce potable water supplies. Medical aspects
of the plan included the possibility of configuring assault amphibious vehicles
(AAVs) as armored ambulances and training all personnel in communication
procedures  required for calling for  medical evacuations  by  air. The
communications officer reminded everyone that the distance from the assembly
areas to the farthest point in the breach area must not exceed 30 kilometers,
because of the limited range of the very high frequency (VHF) radios used by
Marine units.103
    By 2 February, it was decided that the 2d Marine Division's breach would
be  conducted by  the 6th  Marines.1~ General Keys  and   the regimental
commander, Colonel Lawrence H. Livingston, had served together in Vietnam,
and Keys had great confidence in Livingston's ability to perform under fire.
Also, this regiment had the most training in breaching operations, and was
therefore the most qualified for the task. It would be assisted in its work by the
2d Combat Engineer Battalion's Task Force Breach Alpha, commanded by
Major Gary F. Wines. This task force also had recently trained for breaching
operations, and it was reinforced with additional engineering equipment.
    On 3 February,   Colonel Richard provided additional information and
guidance. As previously planned, the 1st Marine Division would attack first
and breach the Iraqi defensive lines. It would then take Al Jaber airfield. When
the enemy deployed to counter this threat, the 2d Marine Division would assault
and make its breach. On emerging from the second minefield, the division
would head north to become the point of the MEF main effort.
    The 6th Marines, as the lead element of the division, would move through
the breach in six lanes. In its initial assault and breaching operations, the
regiment would be temporarily reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines.
The regiment would expand the breachhead line in preparation for the arrival of
the rest of the division, which would move through the minefields when called