30                                     U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

into programs for firing series, smoke screens, and concentrations on strong
points in the obstacle belts. They also were arranged into phases to support the
operation as it moved north through Kuwait."3
    The work of planning required continuous coordination among the staff
sections. There were several commanders' meetings at which the developing
plan was discussed. All of this work continued in the midst of training, during
movement to the final defensive poSitions in preparation for the aflack, and
while fulfilling the division's defensive mission. The plans cell's tent became
a hive of activity. Under Lieutenant Colonel Lynn's guidance, officers and
enlisted Marines worked from the early morning through the late hours of the
night. Working around a        1:50,000-scale map of the entire MEF area of
operations, scores of officers contributed ideas, knowledge, suggestions, and
personal experience. Each one focused on the creation of a plan which would
be simple and in sufficient detail to ensure clarity and guarantee success. The
sand floor of the tent became the repository of the remains of the tobacco, in all
its forms, consumed by legions of thinkers during their hours of discussions.
    The complementary natures of Major General Keys and Assistant Division
Commander Brigadier General Russell L. Sutton* benefitted the division as it
prepared its plans. The commanding general was briefed twice daily. At these,
General Keys gauged the situation or the developments of the day, and outlined
his guidance or announced his intent. He would question members of his staff
for the information he required for his decisions. Late in the evenings, the
general would enter the COC or the plans tent, further refining his ideas and
developing them with pertinent officers. In these ways he drew on his staff, to
determine how he would lead the division across the future battlefields and on
to Al Jahrah. While the commanding general's questions and ideas encompassed
the whole concept of a particular problem, the assistant division commander
would ferret out all the details necessary for its solution. Very often, after the
commanding general        was reassured that a particular officer had a sound
understanding of his intent and was proceeding in the expected direction for
planning, the assistant division commander would then present the same officer
a series of pointedly specific questions. In this way, both generals ensured that
division staff officers were preparing a plan both broad in scope and sufficiently
detailed for execution.
    The strength of the plan when finally published lay in its simplicity: to
deceive the enemy as to the actual point of attack; to effect the breach of his
defenses by a heavy concentration of combat power and violent action at the
decisive point; to expand the breachhead line and bring forward the rest of the
division; and then to continue rapidly forward to seize division and MEF


    General Sutton was already a familiar figure in the 2d Marine Division. He had been the
commanding officer of the 6th Marines from August 1985 to July 1990, when he was promoted
to brigadier general.  He then became the Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policies, and
Operations Department, at Headquarters Marine Corps. He joined the 2d Marine Division as the
Assistant Division Commander on 6 January 1991, and remained with the division until 20 April
1991.