WrrH THE 2D MARINE DIVISION iN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM                   31

objectives, being guided by the tactical situation. As General Keys saw things
at this time, the breach itself would be the greatest problem. But once beyond
that, the division would be able to move rapidly to the north.114 This confidence
of the commanding general was shared by everyone else in the division.
   On 20 February, the division staff issued the operations order as its
Fragmentary Order 16-91 .~ The weeks of preparation, training, and movement
had ended; it was time to execute the division's orders, and fulfill its missions.
6-Day was set for 24 February, with H-Hour at 0530.

                   The Start of Offensive Operations

   The division's offensive operations began several days before 6-Day, the
opening day of ground attack by USCentCom forces. On 17 February 1991,
the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion moved teams to insertion points on the Saudi
berm in preparation for entering Kuwait.115 The battalion was fulfilling the
division's mission of conducting `~reconnaissance and surveillance of the area
forward of current defensive pOsitions in preparation for offensive               operations."
In particular, General Keys' intent was to "identify any enemy units south of the
breach site and any gaps/weaknesses in the enemy defenses that we can exploit
in order to enhance our breaching operation. ,l1~ Having moved up to the berm
on the night of the 17th, the battalion reported that all its units were in their
assigned positions by 1154 on the 18th."7
   The manner in which his unit would fulfill this mission was a matter of no
small concern for Lieutenant Colonel Scott W. McKenzie, the commanding
officer of the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. He realized early on that to operate
in a small area of operations occupied by major elements of an enemy corps
meant that some current methods had to be discarded. For instance, helicopters
could not be used for the insertion and extraction of teams, due to the strong
enemy antiaircraft artillery. In order to make his unit more mobile in this desert
environment,  Lieutenant Colonel          McKenzie had motorized his companies.
Reconnaissance teams were composed of six men; three were mounted in a High
Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) armed with a .50-caliber machine
gun, and the other three were in a HMMWV with communications gear. These
vehicles would be concealed by the teams digging pits deep enough to hold them
chassis-deep, and then covering them with camouflage nets. Since large antennas
could not be used with the radios, the teams had to rely solely on high frequency
communications. However, the mobile configuration would be inappropriate for
this mission of surveying the enemy's minefields and obstacle belts. Great stealth


   `Almost every order issued by the 2d Marine Division during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm was in the form of a fragmentary order. The reduced paperwork inherent in such
orders allowed quicker production and disseminahon, and were more in keeping with the division
staf~s emphasis on "mission type" orders.  During the conduct of the ground campaign, it was
not unusual for orders to be passed verbally whcn required by time and the tactical situation.