WrrH THE I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM                    17

that Saddam Hussein would be predisposed to order their use in this instance.
A further worry was biological warfare.      The intelligence community believed
that Iraq had the capability to manufacture the virulent and lethal anthrax toxin.~
   The Iraqis also deployed to the heel of Kuwait an extensive integrated air
defense system of six divisions and brigades that used a French-supplied
command, control, and communication system named Kari.              Like the ground
arms, the weapons were mostly Soviet-manufactured and included radar and
heat-seeking missiles, plus large numbers of antiaircraft guns ranging in caliber
from 14.5 to 130 millimeters.       The Iraqis also used the direct fire antiaircraft
guns as anti-personnel weapons in their primary barrier and beach defenses.
   To form a picture of enemy defenses, capabilities, and intentions within his
area of operations, General Boomer directed his G-2 for Intelligence, Lieutenant
Colonel Bruce E. Brunn, to implement an intelligence collection plan.       He also
ordered an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for the defense of
Saudi Arabia. Brunn, working with Colonel Charles M. "Chuck" Lohman, who
had moved up from the brigade to become the force operations officer (G-3),
made a series of map overlays and graphics to visually depict key decision points
and areas on the battlefield.        The process gave General Boomer and his
commanders an easily understood matrix to facilitate their decision making. The
same system was used for the assault into Kuwait later.
   The force's organic collector of ground intelligence was Colonel Michael V.
Brock's 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (1st SRIG).
Brock was an infantry and intelligence officer with previous tours in Vietnam,
with the Defense Intelligence Agency, and in the Intelligence Division, Head-
quarters Marine Corps.  The concept of a SRIG was a recent organizational
innovation to improve Marine intelligence operations. It combined the personnel
and equipment of previously independent intelligence collection agencies into a
"type" command.   Marine doctrine called for the SRIG to gather information as
tasked in Brunn's collection plan for analysis, production, and dissemination.
To further the effort, the analysts of Brock's units were attached to Brunn's G-2
section.  In addition, some SRIG assets such as the Marine All-source Fusion
Center, Fleet Imagery Intelligence Unit, and Topographic Platoon produced


   ~The concerns were justified.  By mid-Novembcr 1991, postwar inspections by the United
Nations Special Commission on Iraq had inventoried 46,000 artillery rounds, bombs, and missiles,
including Scud ballistic missiles, capable of delivering chemical and biological agents.  The
chemicals were mustard gas and sarin, a nerve agent.  The Commission also recovered samples
of the botulism and anthrax toxins. Further, the Commission concluded that Iraq was within 12
18 months of producing a nuclear weapon.