20                                    U-S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1 991

the primary airborne defense of the most forward deployed U.S. Navy surface
vessels.  There were a number of near engagements during 1990.    Typically,
numbers of Iraqi fighters overfiew northeast Kuwait near Btibiyan Island to
penetrate airspace over the Gulf.  Marine Hornets countered each Iraqi flight.
However, the Marine pilots were not allowed to fire at the Iraqis under the
rules of engagement then in effect unless they were directly threatened.  On
several occasions, the Marines closed to 10 miles--well within radar missile
range--and were preparing to open fire when the Iraqi intruders turned abruptly
away.   Although the pilots were frustrated that they could not engage the Iraqis
with weapons, these incidents demonstrated how effective their barrier was. No
allied force or vessel was ever threatened by Iraqi aircraft during the 152-day
period in which Marines defended the northern Gulf area.

                           Shifting to the Offense

   In early October, General Boomer's assessment was that the Iraqi opportunity
to successfully invade Saudi Arabia had passed.  The I Marine Expeditionary
Force   staff began planning  future  offensive operations concurrently  with
initiatives by General Schwarzkopf.  To develop a plan, Schwarzkopf brought
in a team from the Army Command and General Staff College.          Colonel
Lohman, the Force operations officer, got inklings of their initial concept from
the I MEF plans officer, Colonel James D. Majchrzak, who went to Riyadh on
3 November for an exchange of views with CentCom's planning staff.       The
Marines became concerned.
   It seemed that the CentCom planners were developing a concept of operations
that treated I MEF as if it were an Army corps.      Much of the 3d Marine
Aircraft Wing's offensive air assets might be used     in theater suppOrt of
non-Marine units. (Unknown to the Marines at the time, General Schwarzkopf
was resisting pressure to appoint a single "ground force commander" for future
offensive operations.)"  Upon hearing of these developments, General Boomer
directed his battle staff planning group under Majchrzak not only to develop
MarCent plans, but also to provide prompt and appropriate inputs to General
Schwarzkopf's planners as well.
   Majchrzak snagged the former 7th MEB planning expert, Lieutenant Colonel
Tim Donovan, into the group which went into a surge planning cycle to develop
alternative concepts that ensured MarCent's use in a more appropriate manner.
On 14 November, at Riyadh, General Boomer briefed General Schwarzkopf on
the force's proposed concept of operations, the CinCCent was pleased to learn
that his Marine forces could be more effectively employed.     He approved
Boomer's concept for continued planning and refinement of the plans. Although
the CentCom staff provided no specific written guidance, Majchrzak stated the
MarCent mission as: