22                                          U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


General Rupert Smith.   This division was to absorb Brigadier Cordingley's 7th
Armoured Brigade already in place with the force.
    Headquarters Marine Corps also activated 80 units of the Selected Marine
Corps Reserve, or about 54.7 percent of 4th Division-Wing team personnel.
This was the first significant call-up of Marine Reservists since the 1950-53
Korean War and the first deployment of Reserve units individually since World
War II.    In addition, a total of 7,058 Individual Ready Reservists and 537
Retired Reservists received orders to active duty.13     Unlike other services, the
Marine Corps adhered to a policy of not mobilizing Reserves for the first 60
days of a contingency.       Even so,         some 64 volunteer Reservists--mainly
members of the 3d Civil Affairs Group and MEF staff individual mobilization
augmentees (!MAs)--deployed to the theater in August, although most were
ordered home after a month or so.         By 1 December, there were only 16 Marine
Reservists in Saudi Arabia.  Within another 60 days, more than 31,000 Marine
Reserves   would   be activated        and  one  out of every eight      Marines who
participated in the liberation of Kuwait were Reserves.       Other Reserve units
filled in slots of the Unit Deployment Program afloat and overseas.             On 6
November, the first round of 800 Reservists in 21 different units was activated.
    The Reserves responded enthusiastically; over 99.5 percent reported in after
call-up.  Virtually all were trained, fit, and able to go to war.        About 12,000
participated in all echelons of Marine forces in the Gulf.   As will be seen, there
were  many    outstanding  performances         in combat  by Reserve       units and
individuals.   The integration of Reserve         with Regular forces      went quite
smoothly.   A postwar study indicated that Regular commanders found Reserves
to be competent, bright, highly motivated, pragmatic, and oriented toward
problem solving. At first, however, there were minor problems. The transition
from the Reserve Manpower and Management Pay System (REMMPS) to the
Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS) was unsatisfactory and caused
financial hardships for many Reserve Marines.        Battalion and regimental staffs
had not trained in depth together.        Some aviators were not proficient in use of
night vision equipment although their overall flying experience exceeded that of
Regular pilots on average.14
    The largest of the Reserve units mobilized was the 24th Marines, head-
quartered in Kansas City, which assumed the rear area security mission for the


    Administratively, all British forces were under control of the Commander, British Forces
Middle East, Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billiere.

     A small number of Marine Corps Reserve personnel assigned to the CentCom staff were
activated in August 1990 and deployed with General Schwarzkopf to Riyadh.  They are not
included in the 1 MEF/MarCent total.

     The call-up totals by category were: Selected Marine Corps Reserve, 23,791(4th MarDiv,
15,616; 4th MAW, 4,176; 4th FSSG, 3,999) and Individual Ready Reserve, 8,322 (lRR, 6,243;
Retired, 615; Preassigned IRR, 1,464).  Of these, 11,860 were assigned to 1-MEF on 28Feb91.