wfrH THE I MARINE EXPEDrTIONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM     23


force in January.  The story of their deployment was typical of the Marine
Reserve experience in the Gulf.
   The   regiment  mustered  about  1,716 personnel    and  consisted    of  a
headquarters company and three rifle battalions spread throughout drill sites in
the mid-west.  Its commander was Colonel George E. Germann, a regular
officer and graduate of the U.S. Military Academy with a devotion toward
physical fitness. The battalions received their activation orders on 13 November
and most of the officers reported on 22 November.   The enlisted personnel--
many of them college students--arrived by 29 November.    Some members of
the regular inspector-instructor staff deployed with the unit, some reported to
combat replacement companies, and others remained at their stateside posts.
The regiment's 1st Battalion deployed to Okinawa where it filled a vacated slot
as part of the unit deployment program.   After administrative and medical
screening at 14 local training centers in places like Danville, Illinois, and
Johnson City, Tennessee, the remaining companies drew their equipment and
flew to Camp Lejeune during the first week in December.  There, they formed
into their usual battalions, the 2d under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
Francis A. Johnson, and the 3d under Lieutenant Colonel Ronald G. Guwil-
liams.  After a brief training cycle that included weapon firing and chemical
warfare training, the regiment flew into Jubayl on 1-3 January l99l.~~

                    Expanding the Area of Operations

   General Boomer moved his command post out of the commercial port to an
unused auxiliary police post in the industrial city of Jubayl on 27-29 November.
The `police station" was a short walk from Camp Gray.    The terrible heat of
August and September had broken, and the living was as good as it would ever
get at I MEF.    This was the first of four moves that the force headquarters
would make over the next three months.
   As the planning evolution and buildup proceeded, the force Operating area
for both training and maneuver space became increasingly constricted. From the
beginning, there had been no live fire ranges available to Marines and therefore
no way the 1st Marine Division could zero in its weapons, especially the ones
that had come off the ships of the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force.  The subject
seemed to be a particularly delicate one for the Saudis who at first were nervous
with the idea of any foreign weapons being fired within the kingdom at all.
Eventually, the Saudis realized the importance of the ranges and a mobile train-
ing team from the Marine Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms,
California, under Colonel John W. Moffett, commissioned the first sites in
November.    Moffett's range organization was good,    and the Saudis were
sufficiently impressed to soon become the sites' second-best customers.
   Another concern of this period was corps boundaries. To the west the U.S.
Army Forces Central Command (ArCent) area of operations compressed Marine
forces into a 30-kilometer-wide band along the coast to Manifah Bay.       The
ArCent commander, Lieutenant General John G. Yeosock, USA, did not yet