24                                    U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

have the logistical capability to move his forces any further west.  The issue
reached a critical stage as preparations began for a three-division Marine
Expeditionary Force.    General Boomer--as ComUSMarCent--met with General
Yeosock at Jubayl in late November to discuss the expansion of the MarCent
area of responsibility.  Yeosock was sympathetic, but without the benefit of
Maritime Pre-Positioning Force shipping, his forces could not match the initial
logistics flow rate of the Marines. The Army's VII Corps, scheduled to conduct
the ArCent main attack from bases near Hafar al Batin,        more than 500
kilometers from its main port at Dammam.   The XVIII Airborne Corps' tactical
assembly areas were to be even further west.    As it was, VJI Corps was just
beginning to get substantial amounts of equipment in-theater and could not be
expected to displace soon.
   To the north, relations with the Saudi and other Arab allies were still in a
delicate and evolving state through November.   Talks with the Saudis revealed
two issues. First was the political necessity of positioning Saudi forces between
the Iraqis and the Marines for the time being. Second, the Saudis were unable
to move much further north without coming within range of Iraqi supporting
arms.  This contrasted with the triple pressures on General Boomer:    to place
Marine forces near offensive assembly areas, to gain space to accommodate
large numbers of reinforcements, and to position the logistics support for
offensive operations forward.
   To solidify relations with the Arab allies, General Boomer stepped up the
force's cross-training program.   From October through December, company-
sized units from the 1st Marine Division plus reconnaissance and ANGLICO
teams from the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (SRIG)
conducted continual cross-training with Arab units to the north of the force.
The bonds   formed  between     Marines and   Arab soldiers during this time
contributed greatly to building mutual confidence and later success in combat.

                        Operation Imininent Thunder

   Central Command conducted a five-phase combined exercise known as
Operation Imminent Thunder from       15  to  21  November    1990.    General
Schwarzkopf wanted to provide "an environment within which jointicombined
operational issues c(ould) be identified, analyzed, and resolved" by faithfully
simulating theater situations and conditions in a defensive scenario.16 It was the
first major joint and combined force exercise in-theater to have fully integrated
air, ground, and naval activity.  For their part, Marine forces conducted fire
support coordination and linkup operations with the 2d Brigade of the Saudi
Arabian National Guard and an amphibious landing force of the 4th Marine
Expeditionary  Brigade.     General  Boomer   also used  the  exercise  as an
opportunity to shakedown his staff in command,       control, communications,
computers, intelligence, and interoperability (C4I2).   Unlike his subordinate
units which had been stable in personnel for months, Boomer needed an event
like this to weld his "composited" staff into a warfighting headquarters.17