usmcpersiangulfdoc5_040.txt
34                                     U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN aULF, 1990.1991


MajGen William M. Keys, lefi, commanding general of the 2d Marine Division, confers with Col
John B. Sylvester, U.S. Army, commander of 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division. The "Tiger
Brigade" reinforced the Division and seized the vitai road intersection chokepoint above Al Jahra
on the evening of 26 November 1991. It was not the first time units of ihe two divisions had fought
together 73 years earlier, the 6th Marines had reinforced the Army's 2d Division in France dunng
World War L

by the CentCom       and  MarCent    staffs, Lieutenant General  Yeosock, the
commander for U.S. Army Forces Central Command, became concerned that
MarCent might violate Tiger Brigade's       unit integrity.   General Yeosock
therefore requested that MarCent's control be tactical rather than operational.
Although these concerns were misplaced,       General Schwarzkopf eventually
resolved the issue by placing the brigade under General Boomer's operational
control.

                     The Beginning of Offensive Planning

   The force continued in its defensive mission during the reinforcement period;
i.e., the protection of the critical port and oil facilities of Jubayl and Bahrain.
With offensive operations nearing certainty,    General   Schwarzkopf ordered
MarCent to be prepared to transfer defense of its sector to Saudi-controlled
forces if required.  On 19 December, the force received General Schwarzkopfs
written concept for offensive operations.  Colonel James D. Majchrzak's battle
staff planning group had stayed up with the CentCom planners, and they found
that it contained no surprises.  The MarCent planning group had been working

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