WrrH THE I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM                35

all along on the premise that I MEF would conduct a supporting attack in
coordination with U.S. Central Command and the Arab Joint Forces/Theater of
Cperations forces.   The code name of the operation to eject Iraqi forces from
Kuwait was "Desert Storm~"2
   In  its initial version, the force's plan involved   a link-up               with naval
amphibious forces after it breached the Iraqi defenses in southeast Kuwait.            To
develop and coordinate these aspects, on 11 December and again on 3 January
1990, Lieutenant General Boomer met with Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur,
who succeeded Vice Admiral Mauz as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central
Command, and Major General Harry Jenkins, commanding general of 4th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
   Throughout    the   campaign,  General Boomer     met  with               his principal
commanders weekly to develop and test out his concepts and plans in an
informal, give-and-take atmosphere.   At the meeting on 15 December, the
generals discussed the various aspects of the draft plan prior to the election of
a course of action. Each officer was acutely aware that Marine forces would be
attacking into the densest concentrations and most heavily obstructive of the Iraqi
defenses. As he had all along, General Boomer made it clear that his overriding
concern was to prevail in the assault and liberation of Kuwait at the minimum
cost of Marine casualties.   The Center for Naval Analyses used a casualty
prediction model (PRECAS) to estimate that a seven-day ground campaign would
result in a total of 9,667 direct combat casualties and 10,552 overall.r            In the
face of these statistics, General Boomer constantly sought to improve his scheme
of maneuver.   His initial plan was just that; it was liable to be changed at any
time to meet his goal of minimizing casualties.   General Boomer enjoyed the
confidence of his operational commander who shared similar concerns.                When
the plan was subsequently changed not once but twice, General Schwarzkopf
gave his flill support.  On the night of 31 December, the battle staff planning
group completed Operation Plan Desert Storm for the commanding general's
signature.

                          Wa4ighnng and the Force

   In the course of developing his plans for the offensive, Lieutenant General
Boomer espoused a philosophy of warfighting known as maneuver warfare.                  It
succeeded the more traditional form of attrition warfare whereby opposing forces
pursued "victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy's material
assets by firepower and technology," often at the expense of large numbers of
casualties.~  Attrition warfare's other features included pitting strength against
strength, massed and     accurate fires, ponderous movement, and                centralized


   `There was never much standardization in references to the Arab allies.  They were known
in operations plans as Joint Forces/Theater of Operations, but this ponderous designation was
usually supplanted by terms like Coalition Forces, Pan Arab Forces, multinational forces, or by
thcir various commands, such as the Joint Forces Command-East (JFC-E).