36                                       U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

control with an emphasis on procedures and control. General Boomer, all of his
major subordinate commanders, and their principal staff officers had served in
combat in Vietnam under that system.
    As attrition warfare was superseded in the 198Os, there was much discussion
within the Marine Corps as to what actually constituted maneuver warfare.
Nonetheless,  there was general    agreement that its characteristics included
attacking weak points by strength, a high tempo of operations, and decentralized
control with the object "to shatter the enemy's cohesion, organization, command
and psychological balance. "24 Further, maneuver warfare required a higher level
of military judgment and was riskier than attrition warfare.
    In the forthcoming campaign, General Boomer sought to shorten his own
force's cycle of observation, orientation, decision, and action, the "OODA
loop," to less than that of the Iraqis.  The decision making vehicle for this was
intelligence preparation of the battlefield.    This system provided an easily
grasped series of milestone decisions as the battle progressed.   In addition,
General Boomer wanted to deceive and confound the enemy's command and
control system so that his opponents would not be able to form an accurate
picture of what was happening on the battlefield. Accordingly, Boomer ordered
the enemy's command and control nodes to be struck by air and electronically
spooked, before and during the attack.     By assaulting the enemy at his weakest
points, General Boomer hoped to minimize his own casualties.       By rapidly
getting his own forces behind the enemy's first lines of defense, he hoped to
create the conditions for making surrender or capture appear inevitable to the
Iraqis.  While he could not estimate with any accuracy the will of the enemy to
fight,~he would do all that he could to demonstrate to the enemy the futility of
doing so.   As he put it to his command element nine days before the ground
campaign:    "We will go quickly, we will go violently."~
    To accomplish this, General Boomer directed that every commander down
to the lowest level understand exactly what his intent and objectives were.  Each
commander on the battlefield received "mission-type orders" that empowered
him to make the necessary decisions to accomplish his mission.   If unforeseen
circumstances arose, such as a sudden opportunity or a counterattack, each
commander was to deal with them immediately rather than buck a decision up
the chain of command over tenuous means of communication.        If necessary,
commanders could even cross the boundary line of an adjacent unit or conflict
with a supporting arm.
    Paradoxically, it might seem that General Boomer's concept required that he
give up some of his own discretion or power.     In the fast-moving campaign he
envisioned, this was inevitable.  No command and control system then existed
that could paint an instantaneous and accurate picture of what was happening on
a rapidly changing battlefield.    However, he had confidence in the good
judgment of his commanders, just as General Schwarzkopf had in his own.       As
will be seen, General Boomer also exercised his own judgments and decisions
that affected the conduct of the campaign.