WITH THE I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM    61

moved from its nearby screen line to evacuate the reconnaissance team in their
light armored vehicles (LAVs) and then worked to disrupt the Iraqi attack. They
operated agile and fast, up to 100 kph, LAVs in two main variants; one carried
infantry and a 25 millimeter cannon, the other TOW anti-armor missiles.   In a
confused night action that continued until after dawn, Shepherd in conjunction
with Marine and U.S. Air Force fighter/attack aircraft defeated the Iraqi forces,
some of which retreated back into Kuwait.   The last action involved a smaller
Iraqi force which took over Observation Post #6 located about 15 kilometers
south of Al Manaqish, Kuwait. This most northern of the Marine OPs was then
unoccupied.   Marine Division LAVs and artillery assisted by air strikes drove
them out in short order."
   Although the reasons for the Iraqi incursions were not clear to General
Boomer and his staff, the MEF commander was pleased with the prompt and
effective response of the Marine screening forces.   Boomer also believed that
the resolute retaking of Al Khafji on    1 February despite casualties of 15
killed-in-action and 28 wounded was a watershed event for the coalition allies.
The courageous conduct of the Saudis and Qataris who captured 642 Iraqi troops
during the action, eliminated any doubts about the fighting spirit of Arab units
on I MEF's right flank.
   The Khafji actions also tested the force's combat operations center (COC),
the nerve center and focus of activity at the Safaniyah command post.     The
COC was a traditional set-up with large map boards of various scales, overlaid
with clear plastic.  The current situation was displayed by grease pencil lines
and symbols. Facing the boards was an arena of field desks with representatives
of the staff sections, major subordinate commands, and other component forces,
all of whom were linked to the outside by "secure" voice telephone.  A desk in
the center was reserved for the commanding general or his deputy.   In an adja-
cent space was the fire SuppOrt coordination center (FSCC).    The direct air
suppOrt center was nearby in its own tactical vans. Toward the rear and to one
side of the COC was a bank of hissing radio speakers and their attendant
operators.  The noise level during operations was high, which made normal
conversation difficult at times.  Except for a single word processor for the
journal, there were few high technology devices in the COC, and indeed, there
was little to distinguish it from a Marine amphibious corps COC of World War
II for that matter.  Despite the inelegance and relatively low level of technical
sophistication, it worked.


   `The BGM-71 TOW missile was a Tube launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided weapon
weighing about 15 kilograms with a maximum rangc of 3,750 meters. Other LAV variants: Simm
mortar caaier, command/communication, logistics, and electronics warfare.

    For a more complete account of these actions, see LtCol Charles H. Cureton, USMCR,
"U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and
Desert Storm," a companion monograph of this series in manuscript form and scheduled to be
published by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division.