62                                    U.S. MARiNES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, l990~1991

    As discussed earlier, the philosophy of maneuver warfare left more discretion
in the hands of subordinate commanders.      Colonels Bill Steed and Chuck
Lobman,    plus a booming-voiced chain-smoking ground operations officer,
Colonel Emil J. "Buck" Bedard, were the action officers during operations.
Although each situation was tracked as carefully as possible, they took pains not
to  micro-manage   situations.    They  did, however,             take special  care in
coordinating and deconflicting actions, and efficiently supplying support where
it was needed.
    Unfortunately, during the Khafji actions there were three fratricide incidents
that caused the deaths of 12 Marines in combat; i.e., all the Marine fatalities of
the period.  These events were of grave concern to General Boomer.

                                  Fratricide

    Beginning in late January, Marines of I MEF came under a series of air
attacks by friendly forces.  These were known variously as "fratricide," "Blue
on Blue," or "friendly fire" incidents. The first of these occurred on 23 January
when a flight of two U.S. Air Force A-i Os strafed Marine reconnaissance
vehicles south of the border after being cleared by JFACC's airborne command
and control center to strike a small convoy in southern Kuwait.            As a result,
General Boomer ordered the fire suppOrt coordination line, south of which all
air strikes had to be coordinated with I MEF's FSCC, to be moved five
kilometers north. As a practical matter, that meant that all strikes below the line
were to be under MarCent forward air controllers.
    The most serious incident of the campaign came on the night of 29-30
January as Task Force Shepherd engaged Iraqi forces near the southwest corner
of the heel of Kuwait.  During the action, a U.S. Air Force Fairchild A-lOA
Thunderbolt II close-support jet under control of a ground-based Marine forward
air controller, released an infrared Maverick missile that struck a Marine
LAV-25 light armored vehicle, resulting in the deaths of seven Marines and the
destruction of the vehicle. An investigation determined that the LAV was about
6,000 meters from the A-lO pilot's intended target. About an hour earlier near
the same location, a Marine unit fired a TOW missile which struck a another
Marine vehicle, killing four Marines.
    As a result of the A-1O incidents, the procedures for assigning JFACC air
strikes by the airborne command and control center were informally changed
for the rest of the campaign.   Each ABCCC crew contained a Marine liaison
officer who was also a qualified forward air controller. They were given control
over four contiguous "kill boxes" bounded by Latitudes N28-30 to N29-30 and
Longitudes E47-30 to E48-30.      This area included the heel of Kuwait and


    `The Marines killed in action during these two incidents were: LCpl Frank C. Allen, Cpl
Stephen E. Bentzlin, Cpl lsmael Cotto, LCpl Thomas A. Jenkins, LCpl Michael E. Linderman,
Jr., LCpl James H. Lumplins, Sgt Garett A. Mongrella, PFC Scott A. Schroeder, LCpl David T.
Snyder, LCpl Dion J. Stephenson, and LCpl Daniel B. Walker.