`TIrH THE I MARINE EXPEDITiONARY FORCE iN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM    63


Kuwait City, i.e., all of MarCent's future area of operations.  Henceforth, as a
general practice, only Marine aircraft would attack targets in the vicinity of
Marine ground forces.
   Notwithstanding this measure, on the night of 1-2 February, a Marine
Grumman A-6E    Intruder night/all-weather attack jet was cleared by a Marine
controller on the ABCCC to attack moving targets that its crew had detected in
southern Kuwait.   The ABCCC was not equipped with radar to monitor the
flight independently and the Intruder crew failed to check its position. They at-
tacked a 1 st Marine Division convoy south of the border with cluster munitions,
killing one Marine* and seriously injuring two more.
   As a result of these incidents, General Boomer became gravely concerned
and formed what he termed a Tiger Team of six officers and one civilian
scientist under Colonel Gene D. Hendrickson to analyze the issue and make
recommendations.   The team determined that the incidents arose from three
problems:  (1) a lack of situation awareness by commanders, aircrew, and
controllers, (2) the lack of a battlefield system for identification of friend and
foe (1FF), and (3) the lack of visually defined cues on the night battlefield by
which pilots could orient themselves.
   The Tiger Team     made   a number   of recommendations       that could be
implemented in the near term.    At the same time, General Schwarzkopf put
forth proposals to mark vehicles distinctively with inverted     "V"  symbols,
distinctive orange panels, chemical lights, and thermal tape. The team felt these
measures would be of little value for air-ground identification, but might be of
some use for ground-to-ground situations.    The first two were implemented
generally throughout the theater within days. In addition to the informal steps
taken aboard the airborne command and control center noted above, the team's
recommendations included:

               * Increased use of the Hughes Position Locating
               and   Reporting    System     (PLRS)  so   that
               commanders     and   controllers  would   have
               real-time depictions of the actual locations of
               their units.   For   manually   plotted combat
               operations  centers   and     other  controlling
               agencies,  i.e., virtually all those of I MEF
               except for air defense, it recommended more
               frequent plotting of friendly positions.

               * Improved situational awareness at the direct
               air support center by importing the TADIL-A
               visual air display. However, this could not be
               done in the time available.


   ~LCpl Elisco C. Felix.