WrrH THE I MARINE EXPED~IONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM       73


   Finally, on  11 February, procedures for next of kin notification were
clarified. For example, Camp Pendleton assigned to teams of five Marines each
to the base adjutant. These teams formed the base casualty coordination center.
If the rear element of a deployed unit received a casualty report, the procedure
was to notify the center which in turn would inform the Marine's next of kin.
Many of the casualty assistance officers in the U.S. were retired Reserve officers
recalled to active duty.
   American forces were the object of intense interest by the media.  The force
public affairs officer, Colonel John M.    Shotwell, received requests from
hundreds of media representatives to visit Marine units.  Only a fraction of ffiee
could be accommodated during the campaign itself, so the public affairs section
established "press pools" to provide coverage as done elsewhere in the theater.
Pool members got to experience the spartan existence of Marines in the field.
General Boomer personally set a high priority on making himself and members
of the force accessible to the pools, and he spent many occasions with them in
candid interviews.  Because deception was absolutely vital to the success of the
campaign, CentCom policy circumscribed reporters in certain areas of their
coverage such as location, size, and identification of units. Although this chafed
some pool members,      cooperation overall was excellent.     There was one
exception that caused great concern.  After being denied permission to travel to
the Kuwait border due to the hazards involved, a CBS television crew drove
themselves unescorted to a Saudi-controlled border area west of Al Khafji in
January.  They strayed out of friendly territory, and Iraqi troops subsequently
apprehended and incarcerated them until after the conflict was over.    Besides
ministering to its media charges, the I MEF Public Affairs Office had its own
enterprise as well, a newssheet entitled Brown Side Out that was published for
the Marines of I MEF.   It went to tabloid format on 9 January.  The office also
produced 80 external news releases in January and February at the height of the
campaign.

                             The Eve of G-Day

   General Schwarzkopf directed the execution of ground offensive operations,
Phase IV of Operation Desert Storm, to commence at 0400 local time on 24
February.  Central Command forces in coordination with Coalition Forces were
ordered to neutralize the Iraqi national command authority, eject Iraqi armed
forces from Kuwait, destroy the Republican Guard, destroy Iraq's ballistic
missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare capabilities, and to assist in
the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.     Some of these tasks
were part of the air campaign already underway.
   The MarCent mission was to conduct a supporting attack to penetrate Iraqi
defenses, destroy Iraqi forces in its zone of action, and secure key objectives to
prevent   reinforcement    of  Iraqi    forces  facing      the  Joint   Forces
Command-North/Northern Area Command. Once this was achieved, I MEF was
to establish blocking positions to halt the northerly retreat of Iraqi forces from