74 U.S. MARLNES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991 southeastern Kuwait and Kuwait City and to assist passage of Coalition Forces into Kuwait City. The force was to be prepared to assist in securing and defending Kuwait City as well as securing the U.S. Embassy. Additional tasks were the conduct of deception operations, the collection and control of enemy prisoners of war, the protection and direction of refugees and displaced civilians, and coordination with other commanders. MarCent executed its ground campaign in three stages. These deviated very little from the final version of MarCent Operation Plan Desert Storm. In the plan, General Boomer stated his intent. This was to penetrate the Iraqi forward defenses with two divisions between the Al Wafrah and Al Manaqish oil fields. He also intended to deceive the enemy as to the location of his main effort. Marine air assets were to be massed or 1,5~~gedt1 to suppress enemy indirect fire weapons that covered the area of penetration. As part of the theater deception plan, NavCent was to conduct amphibious deception operations in the form of a feint or demonstration to fix enemy forces north and east of the Burqan Oilfield. Central Command and MarCent airpower was to attack Iraqi forces that might blunt the penetration north of a line running through Al Ahmadi (Latitude 29-05 North). Iraqi mobile forces were to be destroyed in-zone while by-passing forces east of the Burqan oil field. Al Jaber Airfield was to be seized if it interfered with a fast advance which was focused on enemy forces, rather than terrain. Rapid integration of I MEF supporting arms was to speed the advance, although care was to be taken not to outrun logistics support and supply lines. Finally, although Coalition Forces were to capture Kuwait City, I MEF forces were to be prepared to conduct operations in urban terrain. General Boomer crafted his concept of operations in coordination with the Combined Operation Plan Desert Storm. `The Marine plan incorporated the same four phases as General Schwarzkopf's. The first three Phases were tied to the air campaign noted earlier: the strategic air offensive, the suppression of air defenses in the Kuwait Theater, and battlefield preparation. Phase IV was a three-stage ground offensive with MarCent conducting a CentCom supporting attack. Its aim was to fix and destroy Iraqi forces in zone, prevent reinforcement of Iraqi forces facing the Joint Forces Command-North/Northern Area Command on MarCent's left flank, and to preclude retreat of Iraqi forces from southeastern Kuwait. The final MarCent plan also had three stages: penetration, exploitation, and consolidation. Lieutenant General Boomer approved the last changes to Operation Order Desert Storm on 14 February 1991. The force executed this plan on G-Day, 24 February 1991. In order that every commander in the force would understood the plan clearly, Colonel Steed dispatched briefing teams under Colonel Chuck Lohman to every sector of the MarCent area of operations the week before G-Day. As G-Day approached and the forces of I MEF moved into their tactical assembly areas, the 3d Naval Construction Regiment opened gaps through the Berm. To preserve deception, they also made cuts in the Berm at the bend of the border near Al Manaqish. Combat engineers of the Direct Support Command constructed roads up to the Berm on the night of 23 February. TheFirst Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |