free rein. Operation EARNEST WILL forces clearly contributed t6 a responsive char- (during the Iran-Iraq war) and ter market. Early, accurate identification of lift DESERT STORM both highlighted the requirements was difficult and changed often. need for a robust, deployable U.S. DESERT SHIELD/STORM identified a need Navy MCM capability. for more roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships to meet unit equipment surge requirements. INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence support reflected application of proven principles MARITIME PREPOSITIONING. The coupled with outstanding innovation. A joint afloat prepositioning concept was validated. intelligence doctrine and architecture are No other alternative could have achieved the needed to support both joint and component early force closure dates witnessed during commanders. More interoperable intelligence DESERT SHIELD. Beginning 15 August, two systems are also required. squadrons of Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) delivered unit equipment and 30 days COMMUNICATIONS. Almost every supplies for two Marine Expeditionary Bri- aspect of naval command and control commu- gades (MEBs) totaling nearly 45,000 men - the nications capability was stressed to the limit first heavy ground combat capability in the- during DESSRT SHIELD/STORM. Problems ater. were solved through aggressive management, work-arounds, innovation, close cooperation MEDICAL SUPPORT. Navy ships and and coordination, equipment upgrades and fleet hospitals provided well over two-thirds new installations. The Navy is focusing atten- of in-theater medical capability during the first tion on improving our ability to communicate four months of the operation. In accordance with other services and nations, strengthening with plans, the hospital ships MERCY and jam-resistant communications, and using high COMFORT were activated and deployed on speed computer networks to increase capac- five days notice. Together with the Fleet Hos- ity. pitals, they provided the most comprehensive medical care facilities in theater and the capa- LOGISTICS. Naval forces arrived in bility to deal with a major influx of combat theater with full sea-based, self-sustained lo- casualties. gistic support capability. Naval forces required minimum airlift and sealift for deployment TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT. DESERT and support. Aircraft readiness averaged SHIELD/STORM validated significant aspects nearly 90%. The readiness of our ships was of the Navy's Total Force concept. equally impressive and reflects a high degree of unit self-sufficiency. The combat logistics FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE To force (CLF) performed superbly, meeting all defend America's interests around the world, requirements. There were ample supplies of future force structure must enable us to con- fuel and ammunition. tinue to employ the winning strategy of con- centrating superior force anywhere rapidly STRATEGIC SEALIFT. The contribu- enough to deter aggression or achieve quick tiori of strategic sealift was a major success. success in combat. World-wide sea control afforded by our naval
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