UNITED STATES NAVY IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

Navy ships on station in the Persian demonstrated the international rejection of
Gulf following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
were on guard against possible attack by air or
sea - particularly against the U.S.-flagged Battle group and destroyer squadron
tankers in the area. UItimately,thosewarships commanders in the Red Sea and North Ara-
became the "tip of the spear" for Operation bian Sea coordinated the intercept operation
DESERT SHIELD. as thousands of merchant vessels were tracked,
challenged, identified, warned and then
After around-the-clock diplomatic ef- boarded and diverted if found in violation of
forts failed, the U.N. Security Council passed sanction guidelines. The complexities of the
Resolution 665, authorizing multinational na- interception mission required constant vigi-
val vessels to begin enforcement of U.N. sanc- lance and attention to detail.
tions against Iraq and Kuwait. As diplomatic
efforts continued, Navy ships patrolling the Challenges were issued over radios
Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman andRed Sea closely from warships, from P-3s flying maritime pa-
monitored merchant vessels transiting vast trols, from embarked helicopters or tactical
and busy shipping lanes. The mission of those aircraft flying combat patrdls to identify the
ships was to stop the flow of oil out of Iraq and vessel, its pointof origin, destination and cargo.
preclude the import of war materials into the Information from satellite~magery, radar, in-
country. telligence, shipboard computer data bases and
public shipping records was used to corrobo-
Oil produced 95% of Iraq's pre-war rev- rate ship ownership and other facts while
enue. The landward flow of oil was quickly masters were queried via radio. After deter-
stopped with the closing of Iraqi pipelines mining the vessel was not a threat, not bound
through both Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Tank- for a belligerent's border and not carrying war
ers loaded with crude were paralyzed in port goods, the merchant ships were sent on their
as coalition naval forces controlled the Persian way.
Gulf. Highly-dependent on imports of food
and spare parts, Iraq soon felt the effects of the From the first days of the maritime in-
embargo. Before it was over, the effects of the tercept mission, warships like USS JOHN L.
embargo were felt by Iraqi soldiers in the UALL (FFG 32), the first ship to challenge a
trenches. merchant vessel, averaged 10 challenges daily
- a process that became more determined
Overall coordination of the maritime following U.N. approval of the use of force to
interception forces fell Commander, Middle ensure compliance with the sanctions. Early in
East Force. Under the guidelines in U.N. Secu- the interception effort, some Iraqi merchant
rity Council Resolutions 661, 665 and 670, he masters appeared as obstinate as their leader.
and his staff laid plans to intercept ships bound
to and from Iraq and Kuwait, precluding all On 18 August, two days after the inter-
supplies except those intended strictly for ceptionmissionbegan,thefirstshotsofOperar
medical purposes and, for humanitarian rea- tion DESERT SHIELD/STORM were fired
sons, foodstuffs. An early alternative to war, across the bow of an Iraqi tanker that refused
the maritime interception forces soon captured to alter its course in the Persian Gulf after being
the world's attention as they professionally directed to do so by the guided-missile frigate

- 21 -