of the DESERT SHIELD deployment, MSC              NAVY COMBAT LOGISTICS.              When
had 172 ships underway.                           DESERT SHIELD began in August, the top
                                                  logistics priority was to ensure Navy ships in
     The sealift deployment was not with-         the Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea and East-
out difficulties. One of the Fast Sealift Ships   ern Mediterranean were ready for battle at a
suffered an engineering casualty on its initial   moment's notice. Additionally, ships making
outbound voyage. rhere were additional en-        preparations for deployment from their U.S.
gineering difficulties encountered on break-      homeports had to be stocked with all the goods
out of some of the RRF vessels, due in part to    and hardware they (and their embarked Ma-
shortfalls in maintenance funding during the      rines and airwings in the case of amphibious
previous year.  There were not enough roll-       ships and aircraft carriers) would need to carry
on/roll-off (RO/RO) configured ships to carry     the fight to Iraq, half a world away.
all tile Army rolling stock. Despite these few
problems, MC;C got the job done.                       Naval Supply Center (NSC), Norfolk,
                                                  for example, was flooded with requests from
MAINTAINING COMBAT READINESS.                     ships gearing up for deployment. Dozens of
The material readiness of the ships deployed      Norfolk-based ships were scheduled for short
in support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM was             notice deployment. The USS JOHN F.
sustained at an outstanding level. Measured       KENNEDY (CV 67) battle group had to accom-
in terms of overall readiness and significant     plish the normally 30-day process of locating
equipment degradations reported on a day-to       and storing the supplies necessary for a six-
day basis, approximately 90% of the ships         month deployment in just four days.
were at the highest levels of combat readiness
(C-I /C-2) at any given time. In fact, most of         KENNEDY alone requested some 700
the ships were at a higher overall level of       pallets of food. By the time she departed, in
readiness at the end of the war than when         company with her escorts, NSC Norfolk had
initially deployed, demonstrating a high d~       provided the grnup with 2 million fresh eggs,
gree of self-sufficiency and staying power.       185,000 pounds of h9t dogs, 250,000 pounds of
                                                  chicken and 400,000 pounds of hamburger.
     Navy aircraft exhibited similar readi-       During the first two weeks of August, NSC's
ness rates.  Average mission capable (MC)         fuels division delivered 525,000 barrels of fuel
rates were around 90% or better, with full        oil to departing ships and squadrons - more
mission capability (FMC) rates averaging near     than twice the normal amount - forcing the
85%. The typical aircraft carrier averaged only   center to dip into its reserve supply. NSC did
15 to 20 off-ship requisitions per day. Such      one month of normal business ($1 million) in
figures are outstanding considering the num-      two days during its furious effort to supply
ber of aircraft involved, consecutive high-       deploying ships and aircraft.
tempo flying c[ays, and length of supply lines.
                                                       DESERT SHIELD/STORM presented a
     Overall fuel support to Navy ships was       major logistics challenge: coordinating the
outstanding.   MSC and Navy tankers pro           movement of a huge volume of supplies and
vided timely responsive support to meet all       equipment in the smoothest, most expeditious
routine and emergent requirements.                manner. The Naval Logistic Support Force
                                                  (NAVLOGSUPFOR) was established specifi-


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