facilities and overflight rights. support nor anti-air warfare were fully tested by this conflict. * An opponent who receives support from allies with significant capabili- INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVI- ties such as the USSR or China. RONMENT: Our regional allies provided a well-developed infrastructure in what could * Non-availability of overseas bases have been a difficult operating environment. from which to conduct offensive or ThemodernportsandairfieldsofSaudiArabia support operations. accommodated the rapid build-up of coalition forces with relative ease. There was an ample * U.S. action without strong regional or supply of fuel close at hand. The flat,. feature- international support. less terrain of the region, and the demanding environmental conditions proved both a help * Force and mobility requirements of a and a handicap during )~p~~~~~~5 The terrain second major simultaneous crisis in is well-suited for air warfare, but navigation another region. and concealment were more challenging for ground forces. Sand, heat and unusual radio OPPOSITION STRATECY: Because wave propagation conditions hindered opera- Iraq did not press their attack into Saudi Arabia tions. The normally clear air-mass of the re- in the days following annexation of Kuwait, or gion is well-suited for flight operations al- attack coalition ground and air forces in Saudi though unusually poor weather encountered Arabia early in the build-up, we were able to during the air campaign hampered battle dam- fine tune our forces and plans. Once conflict age assessment, forced modification of plans began, Iraq's burrowing, defensive, survival- and precluded delivery of some precision ord- oriented strategy, precluded a realistic test of nance. The lack of a significant coastline and our tactics and systems against a modern, well- the "bottleneck" effect of the Northern Persian led, well-trained, highly motivated adversary. Gulf made the option of amphibious assault Also, Iraq's strategy was shaped in part by the more challenging than would be the case in fact that it was not a maritime power, pos- other regions. sessed no submarines, and had only limited ability to threaten forces enroute to the theater. AREAS NOT TESTED: AREAS NOT TESTED: * Limited host-nation support and infrastructure. * Rapid transition to hostilities. While the extreme and unique topo- * Requirement for forcible entry, sig- graphical and climatological condi- nificant naval opposition, and tions of Southwest Asia posed spedal antisubmarine warfare. challenges, DESERT SHIELD/ STORM only tested our capabilities to * Confrontation by an integrated de- operate in one of many extreme fense and strong resistance from a environments. capable adversary with modern high- tech weapons. Neither close air * Amphibious assault was not fully tested. -53-
| Table of Contents | First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |