OLD LESSONS REVALIDATED. DESERT mines. No known or projected technology SlIlELD/STORM reaffirmed the importance c9uld have quickly neutralized over lOQO en- of dear-cut military objectives, political cohe- emy mines once they were in place. Neverthe- sion and civic support. Established pnncipl~s less, we must clearly focus our high.tech re- of war such as concentration of force, unity of sources on developing the best mine counter- command, (:`.~ective leadership, the will to fight, measures capability available. and detailed planning were also reaffirmed. THE LESSONS OF DESERT SHIELDI DESERT SHIELD/STORM demon- STORM. The following summary highlights strated in `r~mistakable fashion the value and the preliminary U.S. Navy lessons learned. effectiveness of joint and combined military operations. The unique capabilities of each of QUALITY PEOPLE AND REALISTIC the U.S. military services - and those of each TRAINING. The excellent quality of our of our allies - were exploited~during various people and their high state of training were phases of both operations. The combined force fundamental to success. The all-volunteer force provided a synergistic combat capability which worked and worked well. Our men and women bn~ught the greatest possible military power knew their jobs, knew their equipment, and of the coalition force to bear against the oppo- knew how to fight. Naval forces arrived in nent. Likewise, our experience also reaffirmed theater trained, ready and sustainable. The the importance of joint and combined training, Navy-Marine Corps team quickly assembled a the value of forward presence and the validity composite force from literally all con~ers of the of joint force sequencing for power-projection. globe, then executed a complex series of mari- time intercept, strike, naval gunfire support DESERT SHIELD/STORM under- and amphibious operations, under the most scored the principle that control of the sea is demanding circumstances. Teamwork was essential for successful power-projection. evident at all levels. Maritime superiority afforded theUnited States a position of leadership in implementing and * We will continue to emphasize joint enforcing the U.N. sanctions. The traditional operations in our training. Some role of sealift in moving heavy equipment and minor training shortfalls were ob- supplies inlto the theater was clearly high- served with respect to new systems lighted. and joint procedures not widely practiced prior to DESERT SHIELD. The strategic advantage of high tech- We made good use of the nearly six nology was re-confirmed. We must continue month build-up prior to commence- to emphasize research and development to ment of combat operations to over- retain that edge. At the same time, we were come such problems. also forcefully reminded that possession of high-tech weapons alone is not a sure defense "Routine training must include joint terminology against simple, low-tech weapons like mines. and procedures. Joint flight training detachments (Red Flag, and neutralizing mines is always chal- Solid Shield, Fallon) should actively seek to combine opera- Finding tions on available ranges. The Navy should work to incorpo- lenging. We cannot always afford to provide rnteKCandAWACSassets routinely. When deployed, joint the minelayer unimpeded opportunity to lay and multinational operations/exercises should focus on - 54 -
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