WARFICH~NG.      Conducting corn-                  paign and in the destruction of the
plex joint operations in a geographically con-          Iraqi navy. S-3s also provided critical
strained near-land/overland environment                 tanker and EW support.
poses-special challenges for naval forces. Those
challenges were met through innovation and           *  AN~-AIR WARFARE. DESERT
teamwork. In general, combat systems, tac-              SHIELD/STORM presented an
tics, and organization worked as well or better         unprecedented AAW deconfliction
than expected. While not every naval warfare            challenge. All operations were con
area was stressed or even tested, naval forces          ducted safely and successfully from
participated in virtually every aspect of the           pre-hostilities through re-deploy-
campaign. For example, about one-quarter of             ment. There were no "blue-on-blue"
all air sorties were flown by Navy and Marine           air engagements. Restricted geogra
Corps aircraft. Marine forces spearheaded the           phy, unusual RF propagation condi-
drive into Kuwait. Platforms capable of multi-          tions, proximity of the threat from
mission o~erations proved especially valu-              Iraq and potential threat from Iran,
able~ makingmajor contributions in cross-war-           the large number of commercial
fare areas where demand was greatest.                   airfields and air routes in the vicinity,
                                                        the joint/combined nature of the
     COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.                             operation and the limited time avail-
     After commencement of Desert                       able to establish positive identifica-
     Shield, Commander, U.S. Seventh                    tion of potential hostiles prior to their
     Fleet was designated naval compo-                  entry into engagement envelopes
     nent commander. While that new                     combined to form a most complex,
     organization worked well, it also                  demanding AAW environment.
     highlighted the importance of peace-               Coalition air and surface units were
     time planning relationships and staffs             controlled through a complex sea-air-
     which parallel wartime responsibili-               land data link architecture. Some
     ties and requirements. The Navy is                 problems were noted - primarily in
     Working with CE~1TCOM to establish                 the areas of communications
     permanent command relationships                    interoperability - but the overall
     that will support both peacetime                   success of joint/combined AAW
     planning and wartime requirements.                 during DESERT SHIELD/STORM
                                                        will provide a solid foundation for
     ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE.                             future operations.
     ASW was not tested as there was no
     threat. While Iraq did not have any                "The Arabian Gulf link network was the most com-
     submarines, many third world and             plex ever attempted, and combined U.S. and MNF link-li
     regional powers do, and regional             ships, USN, USAF,RSAF,AEWaircraft1 USAFTACC1and
                                                  USMC TACCs and TAOCs in a combined TADIL AIBI
     submarine threats are expected to            !TIDS architecture."
     increase in the future. Primary ASW
     systems such as P-3s, 5-3s and                     -  Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn-
     LAMPS helicopters used multi-mis-                     mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn-
     sion capabilities to good advantage in                mand, Quick Look - First Impressions
     both the maritime interception cam-'                  Report, 22 March1991


                                               -58-

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