invasion, and over six times the peak force                  plies for two Marine Expeditionary Brigades
build-up during a similar six month period of                (MEBs). The first heavy ground combat capa-
the Vietnam conflict. Sealift continues to do                bility in theater (105,000 tons) arrived by 15
the heavy lifting: over 90% of all cargo was                 August (C+8). The MEBs were "married-up"
moved into theater by sea, and more than 95%                 and combat ready by 25 August. Eleven addi-
will return the same way.                                    tional prepositioned ships from Diego Garcia,
                                                             the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean
      Early, accurate identification of lift re-             delivered 102,000 tons of Army, Air Force and
      quirements was difficult and changed                   Navy equipment and supplies that same week.
      often. Close coordination between MSC
      and the Military Traffic Management                         MEDICAL SUPPORT. Navy medical
      Command(MTMC)keptthecargoflow-                         ships and fleet hospitals provided well over
      ing.                                                   two-thirds of in-theat~ medical capability dur-
                                                             ing the first four months of the operation. In
      We need more roll-on/roll-off (RO/                     accordance with plans, the hospital ships
      RO)shipstomeetunitequipmentsurge                       MERCY and COMFORT were activated and
      requirements. Problems encountered                     deployed on five days notice. Together with
      during the breakout of some RRF ships                  the Fleet Hospitals, they provided the most
      reflected shortfalls in maintenance fund-              comprehensive medical care facilities in the-
      ing in previous years.                                 ater and the capability to deal with a major
                                                             influx of combat casualties.
      World-wide sea control afforded by our
      naval forces contributed to a respon-                  SUMMARY. The naval forces and capabilities
      sive charter market, which reduced the                 put to the test in DESERT SHIELD/STORM
      need for activation of the Sealift Readi-              were not achieved by decisions made in the last
      ness Program (SRP) or ship requisition-                few years. The high quality people, aircraft,
      ing.                                                   ships and weapons systems involved in this
                                                             crisis were products of decisions made in the
      "The successful patchwork of MSCjRRF/charter           throughout the 1980s. So a final lesson might
and foreign charter vessels used to support DESERT SHIELDI   well be that the decisions we make today do
STORM demonstrated the need for MSC to be given higher       have important ramifications for the future.
national priorityand to integrate their operations more closely
with the Navy."
                                                                  Affordability has always been a factor in
      -  Admiral J. T. Howe, USN, Commander-                 such decisions, but current economic realities
         in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Quick            give it greater weight than at any time in the
         Look First Impressions Report, 20 March             recent past. We will have a smaller force - that
         1991
                                                             much is certain - and a smaller force, no

      MARITIMEPREPOSITIONING. The                            matter how capable, will not be present in as
                                                             m
afloat prepositioning concept was validated in                any places, or respond as quickly, as the force
Desert Shield.  No other alternative could                   which executed DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
achieve such early force closure dates. Two                       In an evolving world which contains
squadrons of Maritime Prepositioning Ships                   unknown numbers of Saddam Husseins, and a
(MPS) deployed from Diego Garcia and Guam                    clear dependence on regional stability for eco-
to deliver unit equipment and 30 days sup-


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