UNITED STATES NAVY IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

mine countermeasures operations and ammunition, although inventories of Ia-
when required. ser guided bomb kits (a high demand item)
were limited, and the aviation fuels provided
IN~~LLIGENCE. Intelligence support by USAF airborne tankers posed safety prob-
for Desert Shield/Desert Storm reflected ap- lems aboard ship. Naval forces required mini-
plication of proven principles coupled with mal airlift and sealift for deployment and sup-
outstanding innovation. A joint intelligence port. In fact, only 4.4% of strategic sealift was
d~~ctrine and architecture are needed to sup- used for support of naval forces. Logistics
port both joint and component commanders. messages were delayed by other operational
More interoperable intelligence systems are traffic in the overworked-communications sys-
also required. tem. The combat logistics force (CLF) per-
formed superbly - meeting all requirements.
COMMUNICATIONS. Almost every Doing so, however, required nearly every CLF
aspect of naval command and control commu- ship in the fleet. Versatile RRF sealift vessels
nications capability was stressed to the limit augmented the CLF as ad hoc ammunition
during Desert Shield / Desert Storm. Problems ships. DESERT SHIELD / STORM showed we
were solved through aggressive management, must move carefully as we plan future CLF
work-arounds, innovation, close cooperation reductions.
and coordination, equipment upgrades and
new installations. The volume of communica- "PHIBGRU TWO deployed in a week~nd-a-hal(
tions traffic, the scope of the USN/joint/ com- from a standing start (the first ship le(t after three days). At
bined connectivity requirements, and the high this writing we are approaching the seven month point, and
the average ship has had less than three weeks in port (only ten
precedence of a large percentage of the mes- days of which was maintenance time). .. .The list of out of
sage traffic, presented a communications chal- commission equipment is shorter than at INCHOP. Aside
lenge of previously unimagined proportions. from parts and the occasional large motor rewind, the ships
The STU-III, INMARSAT, SHF installations, have become fully sef-suffident and could apparently stay
portable communications vans, and high speed out here indefinitely."
modems stood outamong many systems which - Rear Admiral J.B. LaPlante, USN, CTF
contributed to success. We are focusing in- 156, "Quick Look" Report, 11 March1991
creased att~ntion on improving our ability to
communicate with other services and nations, STRATEGIC SEALIFT. The contribu-
strengthening jam-resistant communications, tion of strategic sealift was one of the major
and using high speed computer networks to success stories of Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
increase capacity. Major investments in sealift in the `80s paid
great dividends. Throughout the deployment,
LOGISTICS. Naval forces arrived in Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled
theater with full, self-sustained logistic sup- ships delivered 3.4 million tons of cargo half-
port capability. Aircraft readiness averaged way around the world. Cargoes were loaded
nearly 90% with a full mission capability rat- in over 40 ports in CONUS and Europe and
ing near 85%. The readiness of our ships was were downloaded at two primary ports in
equally impressive. Those high readiness 1ev- Saudi Arabia. Additionally, 6.8 million tons of
els were virtually constant throughout the fuels were delivered. This cargo represents
operation and reflect a high degree of unit self- four times the cargo moved across the English
sufficiency. There were ample supplies of fuel Channel to Normandy in support of the D-Day

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