III. NARRATIVE 
In March 1998, the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, published the initial report of our investigation of a suspicious metal storage tank, believed to contain chemical warfare agent, discovered next to the perimeter wall of a girls' school in Kuwait City, Kuwait, following the Gulf War. Although we have not received any new evidence concerning this investigation, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that we amend and republish it as a final report after incorporating additional clarifying information. Consequently, this report provides more detail and a more accurate discussion of the events at the Kuwaiti Girls' School and the evidence about the tank's contents.
1. Location and Identification of the Kuwaiti Girls' School
In early March 1991, Coalition forces in Kuwait explored the Al Badawiyah Girls' Sciences School in the Al Badawiyah suburb of Kuwait City at coordinates 2904N4806E (Universal Transverse Mercator grid TN18832039). (Figure 2). The Al Badawiyah Girls' Sciences School has several different names: The Sabahiyah High School for Girls and the Ansarieh Banat Kebeed School. The school falls within the Sabahiyah municipality and the Badawiyah district and thus may also be known by locality. In 1997, the school was named the Al Nasser School for Secondary Curriculum (Figure 3). Since that time, the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament, the United States (US) Senate and Department of Defense, and the media have referred to the building as the Kuwaiti Girls' School. Thus, for consistency, this report refers to it as the Kuwaiti Girls' School.
Figure 2. Map of Al Ahmadi district. Red arrow points to the Kuwaiti Girls' School.
Figure 3. Photograph of the front of the school taken during the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses trip to Kuwait in October 1997. The sign on the building reads: Al Nasser School for Secondary Curriculum.
2. Iraq's Use of the Kuwaiti Girls' School as Missile Maintenance Facility
During the Gulf War, Iraq used the Kuwaiti Girls' School as a missile test and maintenance facility. A March 29, 1991, initial intelligence report stated Coalition forces found six Chinese-made Seersucker missiles, mistakenly referred to as Silkworm missiles, inside the building at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. (Figures 4 and 5). The report also noted the presence of missile test carts, cabling, two abandoned Soviet missile transport trucks next to a truck-mounted crane 100 meters west of the school, and a Chinese generator positioned 600 meters west of the school. The initial intelligence report did not refer to any missile fuel or oxidizer storage tank near the school, but photography taken on March 1, 1991, does show the tank at the school (Figure 6).
Figure 4. Captured Iraqi Seersucker anti-ship missile from the Kuwait Girls' School. Photograph taken by US Naval officer, March 1991, at Shubaiha Port. Note the serial number on the missile circled above matches that of the missile in Figure 5.
Figure 5. This is a photograph of six Seersucker missiles captured at the Kuwaiti Girls' School awaiting transport to the US. Note the serial number on the first missile above matches that of the missile from the Kuwaiti Girls' School in Figure 4. Photograph taken by US Naval officer, March 1991, at Shubaiha Port.
Figure 6. National Imagery and Mapping Agency, U2 reconnaissance photograph of the Kuwaiti Girls' School, March 1, 1991. The obstructed view is due to oil well fire smoke over the area.
3. Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance in Kuwait
Although the US Defense Intelligence Agency assessed before Operation Desert Storm that Iraq was "likely to have a CW [chemical warfare] warhead for its Silkworms," the missiles discovered at the Kuwaiti Girls' School had conventional, high explosive warheads. A report on captured military hardware dated September 12, 1991, stated that 30 Silkworm warheads to be sent to the United States in September/October of 1991 would be available for evaluation. The Terra Group, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, received 19 warheads, nine warheads went to the Naval Warfare Center, China Lake, California, and the last two went to the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center at Indian Head, Maryland. According to the head of security for the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, the paperwork for all 19 warheads indicated they were all high explosive, not chemical-filled. A representative from the Naval Warfare Center, China Lake, California, reported the nine warheads his organization destroyed were all high explosive warheads. A representative from the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center at Indian Head, Maryland, indicated that he had not heard of warheads for Iraq's Silkworms that could carry chemical warfare agents. He also reported the two warheads sent to Indian Head were conventional, high explosive warheads.
Following the expulsion of Iraq's military forces from Kuwait, the government of Kuwait began to rebuild the infrastructure damaged during Iraq's occupation. To help the Kuwaiti government coordinate this mission, the US Army Corps of Engineers established the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO) and the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO). However, unexploded ordnance located throughout Kuwait impeded the reconstruction efforts. The government of Kuwait issued contracts to Coalition nations to clear unexploded ordnance within Kuwait. They divided the country into six sectors to distribute the work among Coalition forces, specifically the UK, US, France, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
Each country approached the ordnance disposal mission slightly differently. Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan assigned the duties to their own soldiers, while France the UK and the US used contractors to accomplish the task. The United Kingdom retained Royal Ordnance, a British firm specializing in explosive ordnance, to clear its sector. In turn, Royal Ordnance hired British soldiers trained in ordnance disposal from the UK MoD.
B. Storage Tank Discovered: First Week of August 1991
In early August 1991, a British explosive ordnance firm, Passive Barriers, was subcontracted by Brown and Root International Inc., an American firm hired by the US government to manage reconstruction projects in the sector designated to the US for infrastructure repair. As the Kuwaiti Girls' School fell within the US sector of responsibility, Brown and Root were responsible for its repair. According to the Brown and Root supervisor, the protocol for the reconstruction effort called for Passive Barriers to clear the area before Brown and Root commenced work. While clearing the area around the Kuwaiti Girls' School, Passive Barriers personnel discovered the storage tank next to the exterior side of the perimeter wall surrounding the Kuwaiti Girls' School (Figure 7). Passive Barriers notified Brown & Root management, who then asked KERO to send someone to survey the tank and identify its contents so that it could be disposed of safely.
of the storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School taken by the safety officer in August
Encircled areas show the movement of the fumes out of one of the bullet holes. (Photographs used by permission.)
Assigned to support the KERO, the US Army Corps of Engineers safety officer conducted the initial inspection of the tank. His inspection revealed rust-colored fumes emitting through two holes in the tank (Figure 8), an amount he equated to that of a heavily smoking cigar. A bullet had pierced the tank, had broken in half on entry, and part of the bullet remained at the exit hole.
The safety officer reported that he heard that the tank contained mustard agent, but recalled thinking at the time the fumes smelled like nitric acid. He tapped the tank to determine the fill level; it was approximately one-third full. Despite not wearing protective gear and being close to the fumes, the safety officer reported no symptoms of exposure to chemical warfare agent. The rust color, the acid smell of the fumes, and his lack of symptoms akin to mustard agent exposure led the safety officer to believe the tank likely contained nitric acid. The safety officer was the only person who identified the acid smell of the fumes. After the safety officer's inspection, all other inspections of the tank were conducted wearing protective clothing and respirators.
The safety officer verbally reported the findings of his inspection, conveyed his belief the tank contained nitric acid, and relinquished his pictures of the tank to the DRAO operations officer, but did not prepare a written report of his inspection. Major General Patrick Kelly, the DRAO commander, visited the tank site and ordered an inspection of the tank. He also requested Kuwait's Army Chief of Staff send a team to secure the area.
Concerns about the possibility that the tank contained chemical warfare agent and an overlap in responsibilities resulted in four separate related operations to test the contents of the tank. The operations consisted of the following: 1) Major Watkinson's initial tests; 2) the Fox vehicle testing; and 3) sampling of the tank's contents; and 4) field tests of the liquid from the tank on the protective clothing. Following this final operation, the holes in the tank were permanently sealed.
Communication regarding each of the operations was limited for several reasons. The same individuals did not participate in all four operations, and often these individuals were not aware of the other operations. An abbreviated listing of the major individuals and organizations involved in testing the tank's contents is at Tab E. Because of the multiple actions at the tank, some individuals ended their involvement with limited information and unanswered questions about the exact nature of the tank's contents. For graphical representations of what each participant knew about the events as well as a timeline, see Tabs F and G. Also, the sectors delineated for ordnance clearing did not correspond to the boundaries used for reconstruction efforts. The Kuwaiti Girls' School, while in the sector assigned to the US for reconstruction, was in the British sector for ordnance clearing. Therefore, the British commanded all operations to test the tank's contents with assistance provided by US forces. The multi-national participation in these operations ultimately affected the promptness in which information flowed to participants.
C. Initial Field Tests (August 5, 1991)
On August 5, 1991, Kuwaiti military officers tasked the British firm, Royal Ordnance, to examine the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. On loan to Royal Ordnance specifically to conduct ordnance disposal operations, the 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, commanded by Major Jonathan Watkinson, set out to investigate the tank. At the same time, a US Brigadier General in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, tasked the commanding officer of the US 146th EOD Detachment to investigate the tank, and expressed concern that the tank "possibly contained mustard agent." In 1997, Major Watkinson described this assignment:
I attended a meeting on the 5th of August  with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence which was a regular meeting, between Kuwaiti Army Officers and various agencies in Kuwait, who were involved in EOD operations. It was at that meeting that I first became aware of the container, because one of the Kuwaiti officers specifically asked Royal Ordnance if they could investigate it. A member of the Royal Ordnance management team was at that meeting and they immediately referred the problem to me to investigate, which I subsequently did...
On August 5, 1991, the commanding officer of the US 146th EOD Detachment reported that he accompanied Major Watkinson to the Kuwaiti Girls' School to examine the tank and search the site for additional tanks and other suspicious items. However, Major Watkinson does not recall any US personnel being present during his initial testing of the tank, nor does he mention any US personnel in his post-operation report. Major Watkinson's report mentions only the Bomb Disposal Engineer with him at the school on this occasion.
At the Kuwaiti Girls' School, Major Watkinson located the metal storage tank outside the perimeter walls of the school. Major Watkinson described the tank as having a capacity of approximately 2000 liters. No one informed Major Watkinson or any other individual sent to the school of the earlier assessment by the safety officer that, based on the color and smell of the fumes, the tank may have contained nitric acid.
Dressed in full individual protective clothing (Figure 9), Major Watkinson conducted several tests of the fumes emitting from the tank. He used several chemical warfare agent detectors including a Chemical Agent Monitor (Figure 10), British one-color detector paper (Figure 11), and an M18A2 kit (Figure 12). Following standard practice, he limited the number of persons in the contaminated area, so the Bomb Disposal Engineer maintained radio contact at a safe distance from the tank and fumes.
Major Watkinson first used the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) to test the vapors. The CAM is a portable, hand-held instrument used to monitor the presence of nerve or blister agents. Major Watkinson obtained a positive result for the presence of mustard agent when he used the Chemical Agent Monitor to test the vapors. It reflected eight bars, the highest possible reading for the presence of mustard agent. Major Watkinson did not know about a US message dated February 19, 1991, stating, "Fuming nitric acid will drive the CAM to 8 bars on the mustard scale." This message originated following field tests where Chemical Agent Monitors tested wreckage from a Scud missile that impacted near Hafir Al Batin, Saudi Arabia. The report warned operators that fuming nitric acid might cause the Chemical Agent Monitor to register a false positive for blister agent.
After the CAM indicated the possible presence of mustard agent, Major Watkinson then tested the fumes with one-color detector paper. The paper produced no response. One-color detector paper is designed to analyze liquids, so we would not expect it to react when exposed to a vapor. Next, Major Watkinson extracted a small liquid sample from the tank by inserting a piece of wire through one of the bullet holes in the tank. He then wiped the wire on the one-color detector paper. If the liquid was a chemical warfare agent, the British one-color detector paper should have turned blue. However, the liquid turned the detector paper brown, a negative response for chemical warfare agent. The US three-color detector paper also changes colors in the presence of chemical warfare agents: blister agent turns the paper red, G-series nerve agent turns the paper yellow, and V-series nerve agent produces a green color. When Major Watkinson tested the liquid on the three-color paper, the paper turned pink, which he believed signified a positive result for mustard agent. Major Watkinson testified that "Both the one color and three color detector paper changed color, but the colors weren't entirely appropriate with the color that I would have expected. So, that was a positive result, but with question marks."
The inconsistency in the test results using the CAM and detection papers led Major Watkinson to retest the tank's contents using an M18A2 chemical warfare agent detection kit. The M18A2 kit is a portable kit designed to test both liquid and vapors. Major Watkinson extracted vapors from the tank through glass tubes using a rubber bulb. He described the method he used with the M18A2 kit:
The M18A2 kit has glass tubes that contain sort of a cotton wool type substance, which is impregnated with certain chemicals. Obviously there are a whole series of different tubes, which are designed to detect for different agents. One can go through those tubes in sequence, in order to eliminate various chemicals and decide what it is you've got. I didn't go through that process fully, because I got a reading with the CAM and therefore I narrowed straight in on the H [mustard] agent.
Major Watkinson tested the vapor six times using the M18A2 kit. In the presence of a chemical warfare agent, the kit shows distinctive color changes, specifically blue for mustard agent. Four tubes changed colors to blue immediately; the remaining two tubes turned yellow initially, but turned blue some hours later. Major Watkinson stated that, although the M18A2 detector kit produced a positive result, they were not as conclusive as he would have liked.
1. Major Watkinson's Injury
While testing the sample extracted from the tank, Major Watkinson inadvertently came into contact with the liquid.
There was some of the liquid on the wire, which I then wiped onto the detector paper. I can only assume that in the process of doing that, I got some of the liquid onto the back of my thigh, and it went through my suit... It wasn't something that I was immediately aware of. In fact, it wasn't until I got back to the camp that evening that I noticed I'd been burnt. But it wasn't particularly painful; it was more a question of being uncomfortable.
Major Watkinson noted that the burn on his thigh was just a red mark approximately 4 centimeters by 2.5 centimeters and did not blister. He received medical attention for the burn on August 9, 1991, four days after he sustained the injury. According to the medical report, the burn did not blister but turned very red. The burn responded well to treatment with sulphadiazine cream and completely healed within 7 to 10 days. Major Watkinson provided the following statement about his injury:
The significance of the injury is...relevant, because I was dressed in all the full NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] protective equipment, and I at the time couldn't understand how I managed to get burned on a part of my body where there was no joint in the NBC clothing. The implication was that the chemical had gone through the NBC suit. This was a bit of a concern, because obviously our NBC suit was designed to protect us and clearly on this occasion it hadn't.
Major Watkinson sealed both bullet holes with industrial silicone filler and plaster of paris bandages. He then checked the tank again for leaks using the Chemical Agent Monitor but found none.
2. Major Watkinson's Initial Report
Despite conducting several tests using a CAM, an M18A2 kit, and one- and three-color detector paper, Major Watkinson was unable to identify with certainty the substance in the tank. The CAM and the M18A2 indicated the possible presence of mustard agent; the one-color detector paper turned brown denying presence of mustard agent, and the three-color detector paper changed colors but did not confirm mustard agent. Major Watkinson summarized the results of the initial test of the tank's contents as follows:
As far as I'm concerned, the CAM test was positive. It was eight bars on H. [mustard]. Both the one-color and three-color detector paper changed color, but the colors weren't entirely appropriate with the color that I would have expected. So, that was a positive result, but with question marks. The M18A2 detector kit gave test results, which again could have been interpreted as positive, but wasn't as conclusive as one would hope.
Following his initial testing activities, Major Watkinson met with Kuwaiti and British military personnel, Colonel John Macel, the Chief of the US Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait, and the chief of staff for US Task Force Victory, Lieutenant Colonel Donnie Killgore, to determine an appropriate course of action for disposition of the tank and its contents. The initial proposal was to transport the tank to an isolated location in the desert and destroy it. However, it was known that a United Nations chemical weapons evaluation team was in Iraq to inventory and assess Iraq's chemical weapons capability. The container would be useful to the United Nations efforts because if the container did contain chemical warfare agent, it would demonstrate Iraq's forward deployment of bulk chemical warfare agent. It was agreed to arrange for a United Nations team to take samples from the tank.
At the same meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Killgore suggested the Fox nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance vehicles assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment test the tank's contents. Although the Chemical Agent Monitor and other chemical detection kits indicated the possible presence of a chemical warfare agent, the Fox vehicle's MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer is able to identify 60 known chemical warfare agents by their molecular composition and weight of ions. Lieutenant Colonel Killgore believed the Fox vehicle could more accurately assess the presence of chemical warfare agent in the tank.
After Major Watkinson reported the results of his initial field tests, the commander of the US 146th EOD Detachment received information that raised doubts that the tank contained mustard agent when representatives of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence and various agencies conducting ordnance disposal discussed the possibility that the tank may contain a highly reactive industrial chemical. Also, the 146th EOD commander showed a picture of the tank to an Egyptian EOD officer, reportedly trained in Soviet rocketry. The Egyptian officer told the commander that the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School was the same type used by the Soviets to store rocket fuel, but this conclusion was not documented. Colonel Macel stated that he never received an EOD incident report or other assessment to suggest the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent. As a result, the individuals conducting tests of the tank's contents were not aware of the possibility that the tank may have contained either industrial chemicals or rocket fuel.
The Headquarters, Task Force Victory, tasked the US 54th Chemical Troop to send two Fox vehicles to support the 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. Major Watkinson commanded the joint operation since the school was in the British sector for ordnance disposal. Captain Michael F. Johnson, commander of the US 54th Chemical Troop, directed the Fox vehicle operations. Together, they received a mission brief on the previous field test results from Colonel Macel, who was then briefed on the Fox vehicle capabilities. This operation was the first joint US and UK chemical warfare agent detection operation using the Fox vehicles, so American and British personnel conducted mission rehearsals to minimize any operational differences.
D. Fox MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer Testing (August 9, 1991)
US and UK forces arrived at the tank site on August 9, 1991. UK forces consisted of Major Watkinson, a Bomb Disposal Officer, a Bomb Disposal Engineer, and additional British soldiers who formed a command post and decontamination team. US forces included Captain Johnson, two Fox vehicles and crew, a decontamination unit, Task Force Victory's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Donnie Killgore, and Colonel John Macel. A medical team was also present in case of an emergency.
During this operation, only the Fox vehicle crewmembers, the Bomb Disposal Officer, and the Bomb Disposal Engineer proceeded beyond the hot line, a designated line that separated the active operations area from the decontamination area (Figures 13 and 14). All other soldiers observed the operation from the safety of the incident command post or ICP approximately 200 meters north-northeast (upwind) of the hot line. Incident command post personnel did not wear protective suits during this operation.
Figure 13. Major Watkinson's sketch of UK and US elements during the Fox testing
Figure 14. Photograph of Fox vehicle testing taken by a US Army officer
in charge of decontamination operations,
54th Chemical Troop. (Reprinted by permission).
According to Major Watkinson, the Bomb Disposal Officer and the Bomb Disposal Engineer unsealed the bullet holes to extract liquid from the tank. Upon doing so, large quantities of vapor escaped from the holes for approximately two minutes before subsiding. This suggested that the vapor pressure inside the tank had increased significantly since Major Watkinson sealed it two days earlier.
Using a long piece of rubber catheter tubing, the Bomb Disposal Officer and the Bomb Disposal Engineer extracted three liquid samples from the tank. The men transferred the samples into separate glass vials. They placed two vials in two separate brown glass bottles, one per bottle, in a steel ammunition box filled with fuller's earth, closed the ammunition box, and placed it next to the tank. They transferred the third sample to a stainless steel dish for Fox MM-1 analysis. The liquid sample set aside for the MM-1 tests evaporated quickly. According to Major Watkinson,
One of the problems we were having was that the liquid, when put onto a stainless steel kidney tray, was evaporating quite quickly, and we hadn't anticipated this . But nevertheless, mustard gas as I have dealt with it, seen it, and understand it, is fairly viscous, and I wouldn't have expected it to evaporate as quickly as it did. So, in my mind the rapid evaporation of the chemical was another indicator that suggested that this may not be mustard gas.
While extracting the liquid from the tank, both the Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer got some of the liquid on their rubber protective gloves. They noticed heat penetrating through their gloves and considered this a result of an exothermic chemical reaction-a release of heat due to contact between the liquid agent and the rubber gloves. The two men returned to the decontamination area and changed their gloves before continuing with the operation.
Before the MM-1 tests began, the Fox crews severed communications between the two vehicles (vehicle C-23 and vehicle C-26) so as not to bias the test results. Each crew maintained contact with Captain Johnson. Because the third liquid sample evaporated, the Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer extracted from the tank a fourth liquid sample and transferred it to the stainless steel dish. Fox vehicle C-23 tested the sample first. C-23's MM-1 initially alerted to the possible presence of the choking agent phosgene. The MM-1 operator conducted another test-again the MM-1 initially alerted for the possible presence of phosgene. The C-23 MM-1 operator then performed a spectrum analysis and printed the results to a hard copy tape for later analysis. With radio communications still disengaged, vehicle C-26 performed similar procedures. C-26's MM-1 initially alerted to the possible presence of phosgene as well as mustard agent. The C-26 MM-1 operator performed a spectrum analysis and printed the results. The hard copy tapes of the spectra results from both vehicles' MM-1s indicated the presence of an unknown substance (not phosgene or mustard).
After the Fox crews completed the MM-1 tests, the Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer sealed the holes in the tank using luting, a quick drying putty, and plaster of paris strips. Once the plaster of paris hardened, they used a mixture of super tropical bleach and water to decontaminate the tank and the immediate area.
An American sergeant first class, assigned to the 54th Chemical Troop, directed the Fox vehicle decontamination. He, along with the Bomb Disposal Officer, the Bomb Disposal Engineer, and the two British soldiers, formed the decontamination team. The team, in protective garments, used CAMs to check the Fox vehicles for contamination, then proceeded to decontaminate the vehicles. The Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer carried their equipment and the ammunition box to the emergency personnel decontamination station (EPDS) for decontamination. They sealed the box inside three large clear plastic bags with a label on the outer plastic bag. According to the Bomb Disposal Officer, they destroyed all the protective garments and other non-durable equipment used during the operation.
E. British Lance Corporal's Injury
While decontaminating the Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer, the British lance corporal in charge of the EPDS felt a burning sensation on his right wrist. The lance corporal believed some of the liquid from the tank penetrated through his protective gear, so he decontaminated himself and removed his individual protective gear. The Bomb Disposal Officer described the circumstances of the injury sustained by the British lance corporal:
I was watching the EPDS party finishing the task from the CP [Command Post]. At the point when only the IC [lance corporal in charge] of the EPDS was left to decontaminate and undress himself he fainted (this I believe was due to the heat and the time spent in IPE [individual protective equipment]). Myself and another went to his assistance pouring vast quantities of water and decontaminant on his bare skin (arm), which was blistering. He was taken to a local hospital [21st Squadron Medical Center] 
In his report dated January 4, 1994, Captain Johnson stated that a British soldier (the British lance corporal) came into contact with a small amount of liquid from the tank while decontaminating the sampling team. The soldier reacted immediately, suggesting that the liquid penetrated the inner glove, suit and outer glove of his protective garments. According to Captain Johnson, "within one minute, we observed that the soldier had a small blister forming on his wrist the size of a stick-pin head. Five minutes later, the blister reached the size of a (US) half-dollar coin" (Figure 15). Captain Johnson's report indicated that the British soldier went into shock almost immediately, presumably due to extreme pain. An on-site medical team treated the lance corporal for a 3-mm blister on his wrist and heat stress.
Figure 15. Photograph of injured British soldier taken by the sampling team leader, August 10, 1991
A doctor admitted the British lance corporal into the medical facility at Beteal Camp for one night. His medical report describes the injury and treatment he received:
The burn on his wrist was 0.5 x 1.0 cm in diameter, comprising an area of erythema with a centralized pinhead erupted zone. This injury is compatible with a variety of chemical or thermal insults ranging from contact with household disinfectants to perhaps more potent corrosive agents. The lesion did not propagate further, and responded quickly to silver sulphadiazine 1% (flamazine). The patient fully recovered from his heat exhaustion the following day and was fit to return to duty.
Although the doctor said he had fully recovered, the lance corporal reported he did not return to duty until the following week. The lance corporal reported, "the scab on my right wrist took some two to three weeks to heal, but a red mark remained for three to four months." Furthermore, "no one came to debrief me about the operation and I was not told about the likely effects of my exposure to the agent in the tank. During my time there, no tests were taken to see if I had been exposed to mustard agent. I was told not to speak to anyone about the incident." US personnel who witnessed the events leading to the British lance corporal's injury reported that they received no information regarding his treatment or diagnosis.
Captain Johnson provided the Fox MM-1 tapes to Lieutenant Colonel Killgore, and all US forces except the 54th Chemical Troop departed the area. The 54th Chemical Troop and the British 21st EOD Squadron guarded the tank and ammunition box to prevent any tampering with the samples in the ammunition box (Figure 16). The 54th Chemical Troop conducted its after-action review to recount events and evaluate operational procedures and equipment performance. Several hours later, military police from Task Force Victory arrived and took over the security detail of the tank and samples. The 54th Chemical Troop returned to Camp Doha where the results of the Fox vehicles' detection of chemical warfare agent were discussed with the regimental commander.
Figure 16. 1991 Photograph of the ammunition box used to store samples
from the tank,
taken by sampling team leader on August 10, 1991
After examining the Fox tapes,
Lieutenant Colonel Killgore decided that a laboratory with more sophisticated capabilities
should analyze the Fox tapes. Upon his return to headquarters, he contacted the US Army's
Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CRDEC) at Edgewood, Maryland. He
faxed a copy of the Fox tapes and a description of the sampling and testing operations to
The Program Manager for NBC Defense Systems reportedly analyzed the Fox tapes;
however, we could locate neither the original fax from Lieutenant Colonel Killgore nor the
subsequent analysis of the tapes.
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