END NOTES

[1] An acronym listing is provided at Tab A.

[2] Two minefield belts (sometimes called obstacle belts in unit logs) extended from the Persian Gulf, generally across south-central Kuwait below the Al Bourquan oil fields and north of the Al Wafrah oil fields. "Minefield depth varied from 60 to 150 meters and each belt was enclosed on all four sides with concertina wire or ... barbed wire ... reinforced with engineer stakes." "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia", Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0004, pp. 3-4.

[3] Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 265.

[4] For example, the "Iraqis artillery will use maximum chemical rounds until neutralized," 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion Operations Order 2-91, 211800C Feb 1991, p. 1.

[5] For example, , "Commanding Officer's intent: I intend to pass as quickly as possible from assembly point to the far side of the breach," 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion Operations Order 2-91, 211800C Feb 1991, p. 3.

[6] Letter, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Subject: Operation Desert Storm 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Maneuver Synopsis, March 14, 1991.

[7] Testimony of Lt. Gen. Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, February 27, 1997.

[8] The authoritative guidance on balancing the appropriate MOPP level to the mission is the U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, "NBC Protection," January 1, 1991. The Navy had a different configuration for MOPP2 (ref: U.S. Navy Ships Technical Manual Chapter 470 Change 4, September 91, "Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures"), but the Marine and Army personnel followed FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9.

[9] "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," 7th Marine Regiment, April 25, 1991, p. 2-2.

[10] U. S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, "NBC Protection," January 1, 1991, pp. 2-16.

[11] Proofing the lane requires specially equipped armored vehicles to pass through the opening made by the explosive charges to show proof that no mines remain that would cause damage or injury.

[12] "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia", Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0004, July 1991, p. 5.

[13] During Operations Desert Shield, Germany provided the United States with 60 FUCHS chemical reconnaissance vehicles, which came to be called "Fox" reconnaissance vehicles. Ten of these vehicles went to the Marines, with four assigned to each Division.

[14] U.S. Army FM 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994, pp. 5-2, 5-3.

[15] Each chemical warfare agent is comprised of a unique combination of ions, called a spectrum, and the Spectrometer has the capability of evaluating the ion pattern of any detected chemical against a library of ion spectrums of chemical warfare agents.

[16] "Command Chronology for the 1st Combat Engineering Battalion, 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991.

[17] Neither the Task Force Ripper (1st Battalion, 7th Marines) Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, the "7th Marines Log" for February 24, 1991, nor the 7th Marines "Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991" records a reference to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines or Task Force Ripper encountering a chemical agent during breaching operations.

[18] The Fox provides relative readings of possible presence based upon the intensity level of the ions present in the sample, but makes no determination of a level to "produce casualties."

[19] A Fox can take and print a spectrum at any time, but is more accurate if the MM1 is operating at a lower temperature. If the spectrum is visible on the screen, it can be printed by depressing the "Print" button.

[20] Testimony to the President's Advisory Committee, GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, May 1, 1996.

[21] Testimony to the President's Advisory Committee, GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, May 1, 1996. [HTML to PAC testimony page]

[22] Testimony of CWO Joseph P. Cottrell, USMC, at the Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.

[23] An NBC-1 is the initial report of potential observation. The NBC-2 report is a corroboration from a second or more observers following an initial NBC-1 report. The NBC-3 report issues an immediate warning of expected contamination. NBC-4 reports the results of reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveying of the suspected attack or contamination. NBC-5 identifies the actual areas of contamination, and NBC-6 provides a detailed report on chemical-biological attacks. U.S. Army, FM 3-100, "NBC Operations," p. 2-10.

[24] The 5702 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) is awarded to Marine Corps personnel trained in NBC operations.

[25] Lead Sheet 735, p. 6, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC Officer, April 26, 1996.

[26] Lead Sheet 767, p. 1, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC Officer, May 21, 1996.

[27] Lead Sheet 735, p. 7, Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC Officer, June 21, 1996.

[28] Letter statement of Task Force Ripper Fox crew member, "Possible Chemical Weapons Use During Desert Storm," December 22, 1993.

[29] Testimony of Mr. James Kenny, Task Force Ripper Fox MM-1 Operator, to the Presidential Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997.

[30] Lead Sheet 764, Interview with Fox expert, CBDCOM, May 20, 1996. This is because the air volume drawn through the sampling tube is approximately 300 times LESS than in other detectors, such as the M8A1 designed specifically for vapor detection.

[31] Lead Sheet 748, Interview with CBDCOM Subject Matter Expert, April 30, 1996.

[32] "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, pp. 30-31.

[33] Appendix 2, NBC Defense, to Annex C to 6th MARDIV OPORD 1 91, 18 Feb 1991, pp. C-2-3 - C-2-5.

[34] Testimony, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Fox Vehicle Commander to President's Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997.

[35] 6th Marine Regiment Appendix 2 (NBC) to Annex C (Operations) to FragO 11-91, 221200C Feb 91.

[36] Interview, Commanding Officer, Company "B", 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 29.

[37] "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 45.

[38] Interview, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, p. 6.

[39] Breaching lanes for the 2d Marine Division were assigned with names like the Marines would use during beaching operations -- left to right (west to east), lanes Red 1, Red 2, Blue 3, Blue 4, Green 5, and Green 6.

[40] Interview NCOIC, NBC Decon and Chemical Casualty Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, February 20, 1997, p. 35.

[41] Lead Sheet 1211, Interview with corporal of weapons team of 1st Platoon, "B" Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 9, 1997.

[42] Interview, Commanding Officer, Company "B," 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, pp. 10-11.

[43] 1/6 Command Chronology, NBC section.

[44] 6th Marine Regiment (-)(Rein) Sequential Listing of Significant Events - Operation Desert Storm, February 23, 1991.

[45] Memo from 1st Platoon Commanding Officer, "B" Company 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion to "B" Company Commanding Officer 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.

[46] Marine Note as a Yellow Canary, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, February 24, 1991.

[47] Journal, 2d Marine Division, February 24, 1991.

[48] "Breaching Operations, 7th Marines Log", February 24, 1991.

[49] U.S. Army, Message Form, Subject: MARCENT Report, 240955C Feb 91.

[50] Interview, 1/6 NBC Officer, February 19, 1997, pp. 24, 25.

[51] Interview, MSgt Bradford, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, p. 13.

[52] He chose an NBC-4 report instead of an NBC-1 report because they were not under attack, so the report was more accurately an observation of a possibly contaminated area. Interview, MSgt Bradford, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, pp. 6-7.

[53] Lead Sheet 577, pp. 17-18, Interview, MSgt Bradford, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, December 19, 1996.

[54] Lead sheet 1211, Interview with a corporal of the weapons team of 1st Platoon, "B" Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 9, 1997.

[55] Lead Sheet 577, Interview, MSgt Bradford, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, December 19, 1996.

[56] Testimony, Fox Subject Matter Expert, Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM, before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, November 18, 1993, p. 41, and Fox Paper.

[57] Interview, 1/6 Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, pp. 31-32.

[58] "Command Chronology for Period of 1 February to 28 February 1991," 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, p. 4.

[59] Interview, Commanding Officer of Company "B", 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 34.

[60] Lead Sheet 762, Interview with EOD expert, May 17, 1996.

[61] DIA Intelligence Information Report, June 2, 1997, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait".

[62] DIA Intelligence Information Report, June 2, 1997, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait".

[63] Lead Sheet 1288, Interview with CMS, Inc. Division President, February 11 and 12, 1997.

[64] The Fox has the capability to print a list of ion masses and intensities that represent what is shown on the MM1 operator's screen to a tape for later analysis.

[65] In the operational evaluation of the Fox, it was shown to false alarm with a Lewisite alert due to chemicals given off by its silicon wheels. NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Results of the Combat Systems Test Activity (CSTA) MM1 Excursion Test," July 14, 1993.

[66] NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.

[67] Lead Sheet 3858, MM1 Subject Area Expert, Joe Colonna, April 17, 1997.

[68] NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.

[69] Letter, National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 16, 1997.

[70] Letter, Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of MM-1 Data," July 15, 1997.

[71] "Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle," Information Paper, July 29, 1997.

[72] NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.

[73] Letter, National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 16, 1997, CMAT Control # 1997168-0000-303.

[74] Letter, Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of MM-1 Data, "July 15, 1997.

[75] Lead Sheet 577, pp. 5-7, Interview with 1st Battalion 6th Marines Commanding Officer, March 7, 1996.

[76] 6th Marine Regiment (-)(Rein) Sequential Listing of Significant Events - Operation Desert Storm, February 24, 1991.

[77] Lead Sheet 577, pp. 5-7, Interview with 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, Commanding Officer, April 4, 1996.

[78] "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 45.

[79] "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, Preface.

[80] Lead Sheet 577, pp. 11 & 12, Interview with 2d Marine Division NBC Officer, March 12, 1996.

[81] The four Fox reconnaissance vehicles in the 2d Marine Division were assigned to the 6th Marines, 8th Marines, the Tiger Brigade, and the Division headquarters, Interview, 2d Marine Division NBC Platoon Commander by IMEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, March 20, 1997, p.1.

[82] Interview, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines NBC Officer, February 19, 1997, p. 19.

[83] Interview, I MEF NBC Officer, February 19, 1997, p. 7.

[84] Interview, 2d Marine Division NBC Platoon Commander by 1MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, March 20, 1991, pp. 1 & 2.

[85] "Command Chronology for 1 February to 28 February 1991," 8th Marines, 2d Marine Division, March 14, 1991.

[86] "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 45.

[87] A second Marine may have been injured by chemical agents after the war, but his case will be investigated separately.

[88] Lead Sheet 577, p. 11 & 12, Interview with 2d Marine Division NBC Officer, March 7, 1996.

[89] Personnel Status Report, 6th Marine Regiment, 1200 24 February to 1200 25 February 1991.

[90] Memorandum, Marine Corps Casualty Section, Subject: "Chemical Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," March 11, 1996.

[91] Lead Sheet 577, pp. 5-7, Statement of 1/6 Commanding Officer, June 13, 1994.

[92] Lead Sheet 577, pp. 5-7, Interview of 1/6 Commanding Officer, April 4, 1996.

[93] Statement of Injured Marine, January 14, 1992.

[94] U.S. Army FM 3-9 U.S. Navy NAVFAC Publication P-467 U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, pp. 38-41.

[95] Interview, Injured Marine, February 19, 1997.

[96] Interview, Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, May 8, 1997.

[97] Interview of Injured Marine, March 19, 1991.

[98] Interview of 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, pp. 22-25.

[99] Interview of Platoon Sergeant, "B" Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, pp. 9-10.

[100] Interview of Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, pp. 15, 21.

[101] Interview of Staff NCOIC, NBC Decon and Chemical Casualty Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, pp. 23-25.

[102] Interview of 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, p. 22.

[103] Statement, 1st Platoon Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.

[104] Statement, Corpsman, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Injury to Sgt. [Redacted]," December 18, 1991.

[105] Lead Sheet 3859, Interview of Corpsman, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, April 2, 1997.

[106] Lead Sheet 3860, Interview of Medical Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, March 26, 1997.

[107] Statement, Medical Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, Subject: "Suspected Wound/Resulting from Chemical Exposure on 24 February 1991 ICO: Sgt [Redacted], USMC, [serial number]," March 4, 1992.

[108] E-mail Statement, I MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, January 15, 1997. He described the blisters as "classic mustard/Lewisite blister agent wounds," without any graduated skin coloration between the blisters.

[109] 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 2d Marine Division, Commanding Officer Letter, Subject: "Injuries Sustained in Combat Operations During Operation Desert Storm; Case of Sergeant [Redacted]," April 23, 1992.

[110] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified by 93 States (as of June 1997.) It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. [http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/chemical.htm]



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